

STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This year, the Board examines its continuing mission to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling through a past, present, and future lens. This year's chapter on State and Local Policies presents the Board's findings and recommendations through that lens.

Looking at the present, the Board analyzes the impact of recent immigration enforcement actions by federal agents on state and local policing. Section III provides a brief overview of *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, where Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh opined¹ that an immigration agent can consider an individual's apparent race or ethnicity, among other things, to determine whether to stop the individual and ask about their immigration status — the so-called “Kavanaugh stop.”² This section also discusses how RIPA prohibits state and local law enforcement officers from racial and identity profiling, and examines other state laws within that context. Understanding the landscape of immigration enforcement operations allows the Board to evaluate how participation in joint task forces may impact state and local LEAs. In Section IV, the Board builds off last year's analysis of stops of individuals with perceived limited English fluency by looking at perceived lack of English fluency, perceived race or ethnicity, and actions taken during the stop, to determine whether there are perceived racial or identity groups that are treated disproportionately, and whether they are adversely affected by their perceived lack of English fluency. Because California is home to approximately 40 million people, of whom nearly 20 percent are considered limited English proficient,³ this analysis by the Board is particularly important.

Looking to the future, Section V expands upon the Board's analysis of law enforcement's use of emergent technologies in the 2026 RIPA Report, and how the use of certain technologies by law enforcement, as well as the use of other technologies for studying law enforcement, might contribute to — or help to reduce — racial and identity profiling and disparities. Finally, Section VI provides recommendations based on research and data relating to policies that, if adopted, could reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling or disparities going forward.

II. LOOKING TO PAST RECOMMENDATIONS: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL AND IDENTITY GROUP DISPARITIES FOLLOWING REFORMS

[Content in development]

DOJ has been working on a study of potential impacts of California Assembly Bill 392 (2019-2020 Regular Session), codified at Penal Code section 835a, which changed the standard for when a peace officer may use deadly force. The study is looking at the frequency of reported uses of deadly force before and after the law was enacted, including racially disaggregated data.

¹ It should be noted that the case reached the Supreme Court via the emergency docket, where the Supreme Court only decided whether to temporarily block a district court's injunction, and Justice Kavanaugh's opinion was a concurrence to that decision. (See *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (C.D.Cal. July 11, 2025), No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP). <<https://tinyurl.com/yc5vcxrr>> [as of XX, 2026] Further, as such, the opinion is his rationale for the Supreme Court's order, not the Court's decision on the merits of the underlying lawsuit.

² “Kavanaugh stop,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, (May 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/y76xuk47>> [as of XX, 2026].

³ State of California Employment Development Dep't., Language Access Plan (2025-2027) <<https://tinyurl.com/49smaecw>> [as of XX, 2026].

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DOJ has also been working on a study of certain impacts of policies enacted by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) for the purpose of trying to regulate the practice of officers conducting “pretext stops.”

III. PRESENT DAY: “KAVANAUGH STOPS” AND CALIFORNIA’S PROHIBITION ON RACIAL AND IDENTITY PROFILING

In the past, immigration enforcement operations were primarily focused on targeting individuals identified by immigration enforcement agencies as significant public safety risks.⁴ In the last year, however, there have been public reports that immigration enforcement operations in California have changed; they now involve multiple federal agencies and agents who may operate in plainclothes, wear face coverings, or who display limited identifying information as an immigration agent.⁵ The targeting of immigrant communities has resulted in increased frequency of broad-based arrests⁶ and increased concerns about racial and identity profiling.⁷ The increase in immigration enforcement actions impacts those residing in California; California is home to the largest immigrant population in the country, where foreign-born residents make up 28% of the population and represent 22% of the nation’s immigrant population.⁸ This shift in immigration enforcement practices has not only impacted individuals but has led to the emergence of legal precedent that may complicate California’s ability to prevent racial and identity profiling by state and local law enforcement.

Last year, on October 9, the Board convened a special meeting to discuss racial and identity profiling in light of the immigration enforcement activity happening in California.⁹ The Board

⁴ In 2025, then-Acting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director Todd Lyons confirmed in an interview that ICE agents would arrest any undocumented individual regardless of whether they have a criminal record. Asian Journal News, *ICE Chief: Agents will arrest anyone found in U.S. illegally regardless of criminal history*, (July 20, 2025), <<https://tinyurl.com/258j3y5d>> [as of XX, 2026]; Haddock & Roy, *ICE and Deportations: How Trump Is Reshaping Immigration Enforcement*, Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 27, 2026), <<https://tinyurl.com/9y8794cb>> [as of XX, 2026] (“[T]he Trump administration has, among other actions: declared an emergency at the southern U.S. border, enabling military action there; expanded expedited removals, which allow immigration officials to deport undocumented immigrants without a court hearing; initiated a mass deportation campaign involving hundreds of removal flights; broadened the authority of several agencies to enforce immigration laws; directed the creation of Homeland Security Task Forces in all fifty states to combat cross-border crime; and allocated tens of billions of dollars in additional funding to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other agencies for detention and deportation operations.”); Houser, *I worked for ICE and CBP. Our current system makes everyone less safe*, USA Today (Jan. 13, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/4hm7krnx>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁵ Fadel et al., *Masked immigration agents are spurring fear and confusion across the U.S.*, National Public Radio (July 10, 2025), <<https://tinyurl.com/2w5mux39>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶ Blair & Hausman, *Immigration Enforcement in the First Nine Months of the Second Trump Administration*, Deportation Date Project (Jan. 27, 2026), <<https://tinyurl.com/3msvdcxj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Craft & Singh, *US arrests more immigrants in February 2025 than any month in last seven years*, The Guardian (Mar. 13, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/bdfuktbp>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁷ *How the Supreme Court’s Latest Decision Clears the Way for Racial Profiling During Immigration Raids*, American Immigration Council (Sept. 9, 2025), <<https://tinyurl.com/mrb6ar8d>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sanchez & Vargas, *Racial profiling by ICE will have a marked impact on Latino communities*, Brookings (Oct. 16, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/p65duf3e>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁸ Cuellar Mejia & Johnson, *Immigrants in California*, Public Policy Institute of California (Jan. 2026), <<https://tinyurl.com/293p938c>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹ More information about the Board’s October 9, 2025 meeting, including the minutes from that meeting, the materials presented, and a recording of the meeting can be found on the Board’s website. (See Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board Meetings <https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/meetings> [as of XX, 2026].)

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expressed that its mandate to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling in state and local law enforcement warranted discussion of recent immigration enforcement actions.¹⁰ The Board noted that although the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits California’s authority over federal matters and federal agents, California has led the nation in enacting state laws to protect the health and welfare of its residents, through its authority over state and local law enforcement officials, including the California Values Act (SB 54) and the Racial & Identity Profiling Act (AB 953).¹¹ This year, the Board takes a closer look at immigration enforcement operations and the state law obligations for California LEAs under SB 54 and AB 953.

A. Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo and the Emergence of “Kavanaugh Stops”

The Board has recognized that increased immigration enforcement activities can cause members of the public to be apprehensive about engaging with state and local LEAs, even when those agencies are unrelated to any immigration enforcement efforts.¹² For this reason, the Board is especially interested in taking a closer look at immigration enforcement operations and their effects on Californians.

Public reports indicate that federal immigration enforcement agents have been relying on a combination of factors to form a reasonable suspicion to stop a person to ask about their immigration status.¹³ These factors include whether the person is stopped at a particular location, the type of work they do, whether they are speaking Spanish or speak English with an accent, and their apparent race or ethnicity.¹⁴ Use of these factors came into consideration in federal litigation after three Californians were detained by immigration agents during a traffic stop. While waiting to be picked up for a construction job, four unmarked cars with tinted windows and no license plates abruptly surrounded the Plaintiffs.¹⁵ Multiple immigration agents — who were wearing masks and carrying guns, but who had no visible badges, and did not identify themselves — ran toward the Plaintiffs and arrested them.¹⁶ The men filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DHS Secretary Kristi Noem, claiming their constitutional rights had been violated by the use of these factors by the immigration agents.¹⁷

While the district court initially granted plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order (which was not stayed by the Ninth Circuit), on September 8, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the order while it considered the case, permitting immigration agents to use these factors while the case is being decided. For many, the Court’s stay “signaled [] support for ICE’s

¹⁰ More information about the Board’s October 9, 2025 meeting, including the minutes from that meeting, the materials presented, and a recording of the meeting can be found on the Board’s website. (See Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board Meetings <https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/meetings> [as of XX, 2026].)

¹¹ More information about the Board’s October 9, 2025 meeting, including the minutes from that meeting, the materials presented, and a recording of the meeting can be found on the Board’s website. (See Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board Meetings <https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/meetings> [as of XX, 2026].)

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¹³ *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 146 S.Ct. 1, 2.

¹⁴ Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁵ *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (9th Cir. 2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

¹⁶ *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (9th Cir. 2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

¹⁷ *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (9th Cir. 2025) 148 F.4th 656.

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continued use of racial profiling in immigration policing.”¹⁸ As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet issued a final ruling on whether it is legal for immigration agents to rely upon these factors in forming reasonable suspicion or probable cause.¹⁹

The term ‘Kavanaugh stop’ emerged from Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion and refers to an immigration enforcement stop based on the factors discussed above. Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh opined that, while “apparent ethnicity *alone* cannot furnish reasonable suspicion . . . it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors” that, together, create reasonable suspicion someone is “illegally present” in the United States and can be stopped to inquire about their immigration status.²⁰ Addressing the concern that U.S. citizens would also be stopped and questioned based on their apparent ethnicity, Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that any such stops would be “brief,” and that when immigration agents “learn that the individual they stopped is a U.S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, they promptly let the individual go.”²¹

As noted by some researchers, however, this assertion is not consistent with the experience of many U.S. citizens when being stopped by federal immigration agents.²² Americans have reportedly been dragged,²³ tackled,²⁴ beaten,²⁵ tased,²⁶ and shot²⁷ by immigration enforcement

¹⁸ Chacón, *Whose Common Sense? Some Reflection on Noem v. Vazquez Perdomo*, Border Criminologies, University of Oxford Faculty Law Blogs, Sept. 24, 2025 <<https://tinyurl.com/4y978adw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁹ *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 146 S.Ct. 1, 2.

²⁰ *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 146 S.Ct. 1, 3, emphasis added.

²¹ *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 146 S.Ct. 1, 1.

²² Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²³ Wilmer, *US Citizen and Army Veteran Submits Claims for Unconstitutional Immigration Detention* (Aug. 18, 2025) Institute for Justice <<https://tinyurl.com/2hrukr4s>> [as of XX, 2026] (Federal immigration agents encountered U.S. citizen and veteran George Retes, who reported that he was pepper sprayed and tear gassed, and his car window was broken); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁴ Louallen, *79-year-old US citizen claims ICE agents body-slammed him at his business, seeks \$50M* (Sept. 26, 2025) ABC News <<https://tinyurl.com/4sefxcw2>> [as of XX, 2026] (Rafie Ollah Shouhed, 79 years old and a U.S. citizen, claims to have “suffered multiple broken ribs, elbow injuries and a traumatic brain injury during the Sept. 9 incident” where he alleges that agents “violently body-slammed him onto the pavement”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁵ Lehr, *Oxnard Man Released After Being Detained by ICE Agents While Filming Father’s Arrest* (June 19, 2025) KEYT News Channel 3-12 <<https://tinyurl.com/yajvfjdd>> [as of XX, 2026] (U.S. citizen claimed to have been “attacked by these ICE agents, maced, punched, and beaten”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁶ Terry, *U.S. citizen tased and detained during ICE operation in Des Plaines, Illinois* (Sept. 16, 2026) CBS News <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6p4mmc>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Edgar said he was tased in the face. That’s when he told everyone in the truck to run for their lives. Despite being a U.S. citizen, he said they ran out of fear”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁷ Uranga, *U.S. citizen shot from behind as he warned ICE agents about children gathering at bus stop, lawyers say* (Nov. 2, 2025) Los Angeles Times <<https://tinyurl.com/4zetnbre>> [as of XX, 2026] (U.S. citizen Carlos Jimenez reported being shot by ICE agents in Ontario, California after warning them about children gathering at a nearby school bus stop.); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents*.

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agents. Some citizens have also reported having their necks kneeled on,²⁸ being held outside in the rain while in their underwear,²⁹ and being “roughed up” and “shoved” while pregnant.³⁰ Latinos across California have reported heightened levels of fear and anxiety amid increased immigration enforcement activity.³¹ Mental health clinicians have reported that Latino patients are exhibiting “hypervigilance, a heightened sense of awareness linked to survival that many have started experiencing since the raids began.”³² Experts warn that the effects of hypervigilance and immigration anxiety “are not only mental, but also physical and spiritual, shaping how people think, feel, cope, and make meaning of their daily lives.”³³

While many of the individuals being targeted in response to large-scale immigration sweeps are Latino,³⁴ other demographics are also being impacted, including Native Americans and Asian American and Pacific Islanders.³⁵ There have been reports of immigration enforcement officers not accepting Tribal citizenship documentation as proof of citizenship during immigration enforcement operations despite longstanding law affirming that all Native Americans born within

They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁸ Democracy Now!, “*They Kidnapped Me*”: L.A. Immigrant Rights Activist Recounts Violent Arrest by Masked Federal Agents (Aug. 19, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/nkv9m6du>> [as of XX, 2026] (Footage of the arrest of Amanda Trebach, a U.S. citizen, “shows two plainclothes, masked agents pinning her against the pavement as they kneel on her back and head to handcuff her. One of the agents is seen putting his knee on her head for a brief moment as someone recording yells, “Get off her head!”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

²⁹ Acevedo, *U.S.-citizen family “traumatized” after ICE raided their Oklahoma home in search of someone else* (Apr. 30, 2025) NBC News <<https://tinyurl.com/5n8pzswd>> [as of XX, 2026] (A family of U.S. citizens reported that about 20 armed agents “busted through the door in the middle of the night” and ordered the family to step outside, even though it was raining and they barely were given time to put on clothes); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

³⁰ Medina & Soto, *Pregnant US citizen speaks out after being detained by ICE agents searching for her husband* (Aug. 8, 2025) MSN <<https://tinyurl.com/597rjxf2>> [as of XX, 2026] (Video on social media shows the arrests of Sabrina Medina, a U.S. citizen, outside her health clinic, who claimed that “agents roughed her up and pushed her belly against the car”); Acevedo, *A pregnant U.S. citizen went to the hospital after immigration agents detained her* (June 10, 2025) NBC News <<https://tinyurl.com/sm37f77b>> [as of XX, 2026] (Cary López Alvarado, a U.S. citizen, reported that she lost her balance as masked agents wearing Border Patrol uniforms “shoved her” during her arrest, and that she started experiencing sharp pains in her stomach after she was arrested and had to go to the hospital); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

³¹ Sánchez-Tello, *ICE Raids Take Toll on Latino Mental Health: ‘It’s Been Nonstop’*, Capital and Main (Sept. 12, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/55s2d6dn>> [as of XX, 2026]; Preciado, *Immigration raids have made skin color top of mind for a new generation of California Latinos*, CalMatters (June 18, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/yfz9meuc>> [as of XX, 2026].

³² Sánchez-Tello, *ICE Raids Take Toll on Latino Mental Health: ‘It’s Been Nonstop’*, Capital and Main (Sept. 12, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/55s2d6dn>> [as of XX, 2026].

³³ Reichard, *The terror of living with immigration anxiety*, MSN (June 9, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/yp429aes>> [as of XX, 2026].

³⁴ Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

³⁵ Hay, *Native Americans Say Tribal Members Harassed by Immigration Agents* (Jan. 30, 2025) Reuters <<https://tinyurl.com/mt4r2fry>> [as of XX, 2026].

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the territorial limited of the United States are U.S. citizens³⁶ and that tribal identification cards are an acceptable form of federal identification, including at land and sea borders.³⁷ Race- and identity-based immigration enforcement creates a climate of fear and anxiety for entire communities. In cities with a “substantial Native population that includes individuals of mixed Native and Latino or Hispanic heritage, the result [is] the profiling of Tribal citizens whose physical appearances [are] treated as a proxy for immigration status.”³⁸ Navajo Nation President Buu Nygren shared that members of the Navajo Nation have had traumatizing experiences with ICE agents.³⁹ A report by the UCLA Asian American Studies Center and the Center for Neighborhood Knowledge found that in the first week of June 2025 alone, arrests of Asian individuals were “nearly nine times higher than during the same period a year earlier.”⁴⁰

Reported accounts of interactions between the public and immigration enforcement agents can help California residents understand how these practices may affect California’s diverse communities. For state and local LEAs, these accounts highlight how immigration enforcement operations may impact the residents in their jurisdictions.

B. California Law

While the Supreme Court’s order in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* may lead to more racially driven immigration enforcement practices by non-California LEAs,⁴¹ California law protects all Californians from racial and identity profiling in state and local law enforcement operations, regardless of citizenship status. AB 953 explicitly prohibits state and local law enforcement officers from engaging in racial or identity profiling and established the Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board to help eliminate such practices.⁴² The California Constitution also

³⁶ Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253.

³⁷ Kunesh, *Native Americans are getting swept up in immigration raids. Homeland Security Secretary Mullin has an opportunity to fix it* (Apr. 17, 2025) Brookings <<https://tinyurl.com/ydcus8us>> [as of XX, 2026]. Several Tribes issue Enhanced Tribal Cards (ETCs) that are legal identification documents recognized under 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(e) (2024). See also Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: Designation of an Approved Native American Tribal Card Issued by the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas as an Acceptable Document To Denote Identity and Citizenship for Entry in the United States at Land and Sea Ports of Entry, 87 Fed. Reg. 37,879 (June 24, 2022) (representative designation notice under § 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638). Some Tribes, such as the Tlingit and Haida Tribe, also issue enhanced Tribal cards with security features that meet the requirements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

³⁸ Kunesh, *Native Americans are getting swept up in immigration raids. Homeland Security Secretary Mullin has an opportunity to fix it* (Apr. 17, 2025) Brookings <<https://tinyurl.com/ydcus8us>> [as of XX, 2026].

³⁹ Hay, *Native Americans Say Tribal Members Harassed by Immigration Agents* (Jan. 30, 2025) Reuters <<https://tinyurl.com/mt4r2fr>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁴⁰ Asian American Studies Center & Center for Neighborhood Knowledge, *ICE Arrests of Asians Tripled from 2024 to 2025* (July 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/2nyjmzt6>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁴¹ “The Supreme Court effectively rubber stamped the executive branch’s practice of engaging in racial profiling, without any meaningful consideration of the harms that result from wrongful stops, arrests, detentions, and deportations,” said Elora Mukherjee, the director of Columbia Law School’s Immigrants’ Rights Clinic” Wise, *ICE Apprehension of US Citizens Derided as ‘Kavanaugh Stops* (Oct. 1, 2025) Bloomberg L. <<https://tinyurl.com/2t9kj7xr>> [as of XX, 2026]

⁴² The statute defines “racial profiling” as “the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop, except that an officer may consider or rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description. The activities include, but are not limited to, traffic or pedestrian stops, or actions during a stop, such as asking questions, frisks, consensual and nonconsensual searches of a person or any property, **DRAFT REPORT – PENDING EDITING AND REVIEW**

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prohibits law enforcement officers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race and other protected characteristics.⁴³ California LEAs must take care to follow these and other provisions of California law, even when participating in joint task forces with non-California LEAs.

1. How the Racial and Identity Profiling Act Restricts the Use of Kavanaugh Stops by State and Local Law Enforcement Officers

Penal Code section 13519.4, subdivision (f) states that “[a] peace officer shall not engage in racial or identity profiling.”⁴⁴ Racial or identity profiling is defined as “the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop.”⁴⁵ This prohibition against racial and identity profiling applies to all law enforcement activities by state and local LEAs including traffic stops, pedestrian stops, questioning, searches, and arrests, except when officers rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description.⁴⁶

Recognizing the harms of racial and identity profiling, AB 953 notes that “[r]acial or identity profiling alienates people from law enforcement, hinders community policing efforts, and causes law enforcement to lose credibility and trust among the people whom law enforcement is sworn to protect and serve.”⁴⁷ Because of this, AB 953’s prohibition against profiling applies to all peace officers within California and protects all individuals within the State, regardless of their citizenship status.

2. The California Values Act (SB 54) and Joint Law Enforcement Task Forces

There have been publicly reported concerns that state and local enforcement officers are engaging in or perceived to be engaging in immigration enforcement actions.⁴⁸ These concerns are difficult for the Board to ignore given the rise in immigration enforcement practices that critics say disproportionately target individuals based on race or ethnicity.⁴⁹ Given its mandate to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling, the Board is highlighting joint task forces and the obligations California LEAs carry under AB 953 and SB 54 when participating in joint task force operations.

seizing any property, removing vehicle occupants during a traffic stop, issuing a citation, and making an arrest.” Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (e); see *id.*, § 13519.4, subd. (h) (identifying implicit bias as part of what makes up racial or identity profiling).

⁴³ Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a). Other state laws prohibit state law enforcement discrimination against individuals on the basis of race and other protected characteristics as well. See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 11135.

⁴⁴ Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (f).

⁴⁵ Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (e).

⁴⁶ Pen. Code, § 13519.4 subd. (e).

⁴⁷ Pen. Code, § 13519.4 subd. (d)(3).

⁴⁸ [Cite]

⁴⁹ Somin, *Immigration Restrictions Restrict Americans’ Liberties*, Cato Institute (Mar. 20, 2026)

<<https://tinyurl.com/52hwa2e6>> [as of XX, 2026]; Chrishti and Bush-Joseph, *In First 100 Days, Trump 2.0 Has Dramatically Reshaped the U.S. Immigration System, but Is Not Meeting Mass Deportation Aims*, Migration Policy Institute (Apr. 24, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y8ae4hxn>> [as of XX, 2026].

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California state law restricts state and local law enforcement officers from engaging in immigration enforcement actions, with a number of exceptions.⁵⁰ SB 54⁵¹ defines “immigration enforcement” as “any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.”⁵² Importantly, SB 54’s general restrictions do not prevent a state or local law enforcement agency from conducting enforcement or investigative duties associated with a “joint law enforcement task force,” which, by definition, includes at least one federal LEA,⁵³ provided the following conditions are met: (a) the joint task force’s primary purpose is not immigration enforcement; (b) the enforcement or investigative duties are primarily related to a violation of state or federal law unrelated to immigration enforcement; and, (c) participation in the joint task force does not violate any local law or policy to which it is otherwise subject.⁵⁴

California LEAs must also comply with local laws or agency policies that may impose greater restrictions on their activities than SB 54. The California Department of Justice (CADOJ) Division of Law Enforcement (DLE) has reminded California LEAs that they should “determine whether, even if SB 54 permits assistance in immigration enforcement related activities, the agency’s policy or local law or policies prohibit such activities.”⁵⁵ Further, if a particular activity is prohibited by the agency or the agency’s jurisdiction, the agency “must comply with the more restrictive conditions of the agency or jurisdiction so long as the local law or policy complies with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644, governing restrictions on the exchange of a person’s immigration and citizenship status with government officials.”⁵⁶ Among the laws and policies which LEAs must direct their attention to is, of course, AB 953 and its prohibition on racial and identity profiling. Taken together, SB 54 and AB 953 restrict California law enforcement officers engaging in racial or identity profiling, including while on a joint federal task force.

Thus, while non-California officers may be relying on factors such as an individual’s perceived race or ethnicity, or a person’s language or accent to decide that they have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual and ask about their immigration status, California state and local law enforcement officers that participate in joint task forces with non-California agencies should be cognizant of the California prohibition on racial or identity profiling.

⁵⁰ Gov. Code, §§ 7284.6, subd. (a)(1)(C), 7282.5, subds. (a), (b).

⁵¹ SB 54 was signed into law on October 5, 2017, and went into effect January 1, 2018.

⁵² Gov. Code, § 7284.4, subd. (f).

⁵³ Gov. Code, § 7284.4, subd. (g).

⁵⁴ Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (b)(3)(A)-(C). For an overview of the various ways SB 54 limits the discretion of California LEAs to participate in immigration-related activities please review the information bulletin issues by the California Department of Justice Division of Law Enforcement on January 17, 2025 available here: <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf> [as of XX, 2026].

⁵⁵ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2025-DLE-03, Updated Responsibilities of LEAs Under the California Values Act, California TRUST Act, and the California TRUTH Act* (Jan. 17, 2025) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁵⁶ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2025-DLE-03, Updated Responsibilities of LEAs Under the California Values Act, California TRUST Act, and the California TRUTH Act* (Jan. 17, 2025) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

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a. SB 54 Joint Task Force Reports

California LEAs must submit a report annually to the CADOJ if they choose to participate in a joint law enforcement task force.⁵⁷ The Attorney General reports on the total number of arrests made by joint law enforcement task forces and the total number of arrests made for the purpose of immigration enforcement by all task force participants, including federal LEAs.⁵⁸ The Attorney General's reporting obligations began on March 1, 2019.⁵⁹ The information contained in the reports is based on the submissions the CADOJ receives from law enforcement agencies. The CADOJ conducts outreach and quality control reviews, but ultimately California LEAs are responsible for the accuracy of their submissions.⁶⁰

Public awareness of the number of arrests made by joint task forces may be becoming more salient given the current approach to immigration enforcement. The number of arrests made by participants in joint task forces that were reported as arrests made for immigration enforcement purposes increased markedly in 2025. The progression is documented in the table below. For clarity, the reported numbers do not indicate how many, if any, of the arrests made for immigration enforcement purposes were made by California state or local law enforcement officers, as distinguished from federal or other non-California officers.

Year	Total Arrests Reported by Task Force Participants	Arrests for Purpose of Immigration Enforcement
2018 ⁶¹	13,960	7
2019 ⁶²	15,672	35*
2020 ⁶³	13,737	1
2021 ⁶⁴	13,962	0
2022 ⁶⁵	14,163	1

⁵⁷ Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (c)(1).

⁵⁸ Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d).

⁵⁹ Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d).

⁶⁰ Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d). Reports on the number of arrests made by joint law enforcement task forces are available here: <https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/resources/publications> [as of XX, 2026]. Of note, California law enforcement agencies are the owners of the information submitted to the California Department of Justice. Since there is no list or registry of all joint task forces for comparison, the California Department of Justice cannot verify the completeness or accuracy of the data it receives. The information contained in the reports is based on the submissions it receives from law enforcement agencies. The California Department of Justice conducts outreach and quality control reviews, but ultimately California LEAs are responsible for the accuracy of their submissions. The reports issued by the California Department of Justice note this limitation.

⁶¹ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *California Values Act Report 2018* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/values-act-sb54-2018.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶² Cal. Dept. of Justice, *California Values Act Report 2019* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/SB54%20Pub%202019.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶³ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2020* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/SB54%202020%20Final.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶⁴ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2021* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/values-act-sb54-2021.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶⁵ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2022* (Mar. 2023) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/sb54-report-2022.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

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Year	Total Arrests Reported by Task Force Participants	Arrests for Purpose of Immigration Enforcement
2023 ⁶⁶	13,760	0
2024 ⁶⁷	18,085	12
2025 ⁶⁸	16,613	300*

It is important to note the context of these numbers: In 2026, of the 300 arrests for the purpose of immigration enforcement by a task force, 277 were specifically reported by San Diego Harbor Police Department (PD) for involvement with the Marine Task Force. That task force accounted for 92% of arrests for immigration purposes in 2025. The San Diego Harbor PD flagged this task force since their agency “did not participate in any investigations/arrests related to Title 8 immigration violations or human smuggling activities.” However, since the San Diego Harbor PD was providing support to the task force on an ongoing basis, it did qualify for reporting.

Similarly, in 2019, the majority of arrests for the purpose of immigration enforcement were associated with the Marine Task Force. That year, there were 22 arrests reported by the San Diego Harbor PD’s involvement with the Marine Task Force that were also attributed to human smuggling and human trafficking.

IV. PRESENT DISPARITIES IN POST-STOP ACTIONS BY PERCEIVED ENGLISH FLUENCY

A. Analysis of 2025 RIPA Data Compared to Prior Years

This year, the Board continues its previous assessment of the relationship between perceived race/ethnicity and language fluency in stops. The Board examines whether being perceived as having limited English fluency changes the likelihood of certain actions being taken or stop outcomes depending on an individual’s perceived race/ethnicity. The Board’s analysis assesses the influence of perceived English fluency on twelve stop actions/outcomes for each perceived race/ethnicity and each year. The analysis also examines statistically significant differences in the interaction between perceived language and race/ethnicity⁶⁹ in 2022, the first year statewide of reporting, to 2025, the most recent year of data, to assess if these interactions have changed over time.

Interpreting the Results

The Board’s analyses tested for statistically significant differences within each race/ethnicity by perceived English fluency status; significant results are denoted with an asterisk. A statistically significant result indicates such differences are unlikely due to chance alone. Importantly, not every instance of statistical significance in the tables indicates a strong effect; a statistically significant result may be a very small difference between the two groups. The results are

⁶⁶ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2023* (Mar. 2024) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/SB%2054%20Values%20Act%20Report%202023.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶⁷ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report fo2024* (Feb. 2025) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/sb54-values-act-report-2024.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶⁸ Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2025* (Feb. 2026) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/sb-54-values-act-report-2025.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁶⁹ Due to low counts when split by perceived English fluency across different actions taken and stop outcomes, Multiracial, Pacific Islander, and Native American identity groups were excluded from the analysis.

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summarized in tables X1 – X4 below. In these tables, positive rates indicate that individuals of the same race/ethnicity experienced certain actions or outcomes during a stop more often if officers perceived them to have limited or no English fluency. Conversely, negative rates indicate that these actions or outcomes during a stop occurred less often if officers perceived individuals to have limited or no English fluency. The tables show that the effect of perceived English fluency was not the same for each perceived race/ethnicity and additionally, this interaction effect varied across different actions or outcomes.

To better contextualize the difference in rates between the two groups, the ratio difference will accompany the percentage point difference for all actions and outcomes. For example, in 2022, officers pointed firearms in 0.38 percent of stops involving individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian and with perceived limited English fluency. In contrast, officers pointed firearms in 0.16 percent of stops involving individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian and with perceived English fluency. Calculating the ratio difference ($0.38/0.16 = 2.38$) tells us that officers pointed their firearms at individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian with limited English fluency at a 2.38 times greater rate compared to those of the same race/ethnicity with perceived English fluency. However, the percentage point difference for those two groups, though statistically significant, is less than a single percentage point ($0.38 - 0.16 = 0.22$ percentage point difference). These numbers together can give a more nuanced understanding of how perceived language fluency is affecting the rates of actions taken and stop outcomes, especially regarding the magnitude of the differences in rates.⁷⁰

Outcomes for 2022-2025 RIPA data: Language Fluency by Race

In 2022, the most statistically significant differences between perceived language fluency in rates for actions taken or other stop outcomes were for individuals perceived as Asian, Black, and Hispanic/Latine(x). Officers reported discovering evidence/contraband in searches of individuals perceived as Asian with limited/no English fluency (36.61% of stops of individuals perceived as Asian with limited English fluency) at a rate 1.36 times greater than for those perceived as Asian and English fluent (26.70% of stops of individuals perceived as Asian and English fluent). This represents a 9.91 percentage point difference between the two groups. The difference contrasts with the smaller effects of English fluency on other race/ethnicities' discovery rates ($-0.59 - 1.72$).

Officers handcuffed individuals perceived as Black with limited/no English fluency (23.03% of stops) at a rate 1.46 times greater than for those perceived as Black and English fluent (15.73% of stops). This represents a 7.30 percentage point difference between the two groups. While this difference was the greatest between the two groups for individuals perceived as Black, all race/ethnicities had statistically significant effects of English fluency when being handcuffed by an officer ($1.96 - 2.96$).

Officers reported a 2.76 times greater rate of conducting field sobriety tests in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) with limited/no English fluency (6.05% of stops) compared to those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (2.19% of stops). This represents a 3.86 percentage point difference between the two groups. These differences were noticeable in comparison to many of the other rates of actions or outcomes in which there was no noticeable difference by English fluency level, such as field sobriety tests of individuals perceived as White (a 0.17 percentage point difference between perceived fluent and non-fluent individuals) or Black (a 0.36 percentage point difference).

⁷⁰ The tables in this section only present the percentage point differences between the two groups. Tables for the rates of each group in each year can be found in [Appendix XX](#).

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Across all statistically significant results, those perceived as Asian, Middle Eastern/South Asian, and White had no actions or stop outcomes where the group perceived as English fluent experienced higher rates of those actions or stops when compared with individuals with perceived as limited/non-English. Those perceived as Black, and Hispanic/Latine(x) had a mix of higher and lower rates between the two groups.

Table X1. Percentage point difference in outcome/action rates between individuals with perceived limited English fluency and perceived English fluency across all race/ethnicities for 2022 RIPA data.⁷¹

Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Asked Consent to Search Person	-0.11	-1.05	-0.77*	0.57*	0.09
Asked Consent to Search Property	-0.08	-0.94	-0.39*	0.32	0.21
Curbside Detention	1.73*	2.39*	1.45*	2.23*	0.79
Discovery Rate	9.91*	1.37	-0.59	0.07	1.72
Field Sobriety Test	0.44*	0.36	3.86*	0.98*	0.17
Firearm Point	0.08	0.68	0.11*	0.22*	0.40*
Handcuffed	2.49*	7.30*	2.67*	2.96*	1.96*
Psychiatric Hold	0.25*	2.06*	-0.15*	0.31	0.73*
Removed from Vehicle by Order	0.39*	-0.15	1.36*	1.06*	1.75*
Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact	0.03	-0.65*	-0.17*	0.05	-0.01
Searched Person	1.96*	2.33	1.29*	2.58*	0.41
Searched Property	1.24*	-1.72	-0.10	0.72*	0.14

Note. Negative scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at lower rates than perceived fluent individuals; positive scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at higher rates than perceived fluent individuals.

In 2023, the greatest statistically significant differences between perceived language fluency in rates for actions taken or other stop outcomes were for those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x), Black, and Middle Eastern/South Asian. Officers reported a 2.66 times greater rate of conducting field sobriety tests in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) with limited/no English fluency (6.47% of stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) with limited/no English fluency) compared to those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (2.43% of stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent). This represents a

⁷¹ For tables X1 – X5, an asterisk represents statistical significance within a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Due to the large number of statistical tests in this analysis, the confidence intervals were made stricter using the Bonferroni correction method. More information on the methodology of this analysis can be found in Appendix XX.

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4.04 percentage point difference between the two groups. The difference also contrasts with the smaller effects of English fluency for other race/ethnicities, which all have less than one percentage point differences (-0.35 – 0.75) for the same action.

Officers ordered individuals perceived as Black and English fluent out of their vehicles (6.37% of stops) at a rate 2.16 times greater than for those perceived as Black with limited/no English fluency (2.95% of stops). This represents a 3.42 percentage point difference between the two groups.

Officers handcuffed individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) with limited/no English fluency (13.09% of stops) at a rate 1.24 times greater than for those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (10.55% of stops). This represents a 2.54 percentage point difference between the two groups. Officers also handcuffed individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian with limited/no English fluency (5.83% of stops) at a rate 1.75 times greater than for those perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian and English fluent (3.29% of stops). This represents a 2.54 percentage point difference between the two groups. While this difference was the greatest between the two groups for individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and Middle Eastern/South Asian, all other race/ethnicities had statistically significant effects of English fluency when being handcuffed by an officer (1.29 – 2.06).

These differences were noticeable in comparison to many of the other rates in which there was no noticeable difference by English fluency level, such as removal from vehicle by physical contact of individuals perceived as White (a 0.18 percentage point difference between perceived fluent and non-fluent individuals), Asian (a 0.01 percentage point difference), or Middle Eastern/South Asian (a 0.01 percentage point difference). Across all statistically significant results, those perceived as Asian and Middle Eastern/South Asian had no actions or stop outcomes where the English fluent group had higher rates than the limited/non-English fluent group, while those perceived as Black, Hispanic/Latine(x), and White had a mix of higher and lower rates between the two groups.

Table X2. Percentage point difference in rates of outcomes between perceived limited English fluency and perceived English fluency across all race/ethnicities for 2023 RIPA data.⁷²

Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Asked Consent to Search Person	0.02	0.81*	-0.65*	0.47*	0.75*
Asked Consent to Search Property	0.16	0.56	-0.33*	0.31*	0.93*
Curbside Detention	1.45*	1.26*	0.89*	1.62*	0.74*
Discovery Rate	4.52	1.14	-2.01*	-0.53	1.34
Field Sobriety Test	0.36*	-0.35	4.04*	0.75*	0.11
Firearm Point	0.16*	0.11	0.01	0.27*	0.06
Handcuffed	1.66*	2.06*	2.54*	2.54*	1.29*

⁷² For tables X1 – X5, an asterisk represents statistical significance within a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Due to the large number of statistical tests in this analysis, the confidence intervals were made stricter using the Bonferroni correction method. More information on the methodology of this analysis can be found in Appendix XX.

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Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Psychiatric Hold	0.09	0.42	-0.17*	0.19	0.03
Removed from Vehicle by Order	0.18	-3.42*	1.30*	0.86*	-1.40*
Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact	0.01	-0.77*	-0.17*	0.01	-0.18*
Searched Person	1.16*	-0.33	1.52*	2.11*	1.11*
Searched Property	0.80*	-0.46	-0.10	0.81*	1.34*

Note. Negative scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at lower rates than perceived fluent individuals; positive scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at higher rates than perceived fluent individuals.

Figure X2. Legend for interpreting Table X2 results.

	Negative Difference: Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency were more likely to experience the stop action or outcome than those perceived as English fluent, and this difference was statistically significant.
	Positive Difference: Individuals perceived as English fluent were more likely to experience the stop action or outcome than those perceived as having limited/no English fluency, and this difference was statistically significant.

Table X2. Percentage point difference in outcome/action rates between individuals with perceived limited English fluency and perceived English fluency across all race/ethnicities for 2022 RIPA data.⁷³

Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Asked Consent to Search Person	-0.10	-1.07	-0.77*	0.57*	0.08
Asked Consent to Search Property	-0.07	-0.96	-0.39*	0.32	0.20
Curbside Detention	1.73*	2.41*	1.45*	2.23*	0.80
Discovery Rate	9.97*	1.49	-0.59	0.07	1.71
Field Sobriety Test	0.44*	0.36	3.86*	0.98*	0.18
Firearm Point	0.07	0.68	0.11*	0.22*	0.39*
Handcuffed	2.49*	7.30*	2.67*	2.95*	1.96*
Psychiatric Hold	0.25*	2.06*	-0.15*	0.31	0.74*
Removed from Vehicle by Order	0.39*	-0.14	1.36*	1.04*	1.75*

⁷³ For tables X1 – X5, an asterisk represents statistical significance within a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Due to the large number of statistical tests in this analysis, the confidence intervals were made stricter using the Bonferroni correction method. More information on the methodology of this analysis can be found in Appendix XX.

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Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact	0.02	-0.66*	-0.18*	0.05	0.00
Searched Person	1.95*	2.33	1.30*	2.58*	0.41
Searched Property	1.24*	-1.69	-0.09	0.72*	0.14

Note. Negative scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at lower rates than perceived fluent individuals.

In 2024, the greatest statistically significant differences between perceived language fluency in rates for actions taken or other stop outcomes were for those perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, Hispanic/Latine(x), and Black. Officers reported discovering evidence/contraband in searches of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian and English fluent (21.39% of searches of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian and English fluent) at a rate 1.24 times greater than for those perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian with limited/no English fluency (17.21% of searches of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian with limited/no English fluency). This represents a 4.18 percentage point difference between the two groups.

Officers reported a 2.63 times greater rate of conducting field sobriety tests in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and having limited English fluency (6.04% of stops) compared to those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (2.29% of stops). This represents a 3.75 percentage point difference between the two groups. The difference contrasts with the smaller effects of English fluency for other race/ethnicities that all have less than one percentage point differences (-0.42 – 0.65) for the same action.

Officers handcuffed individuals perceived as Black with limited/no English fluency (19.37% of stops) at a rate 1.21 times greater than for those perceived as Black and English fluent (15.97% of stops). This represents a 3.40 percentage point difference between the two groups. While this difference was the greatest between the two groups for those perceived as Black, all other race/ethnicities had statistically significant effects of limited English fluency when being handcuffed by an officer (1.30 – 2.62).

These differences were noticeable in comparison to many of the other rates in which there was no noticeable difference by English fluency level, such as removal from vehicle by physical contact of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (a 0.06 percentage point difference) or Asian (a 0.01 percentage point difference). Across all statistically significant results, those perceived as Asian had no actions or stop outcomes where the English fluent group had higher rates than the limited/non-English fluent group, while all other perceived races/ethnicities had a mix of higher and lower rates between the two groups.

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Table X3. Percentage point difference in rates of outcomes between perceived limited English fluency and perceived English fluency across all race/ethnicities for 2024 RIPA data.⁷⁴

Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Asked Consent to Search Person	0.19	0.80*	0.19*	0.53*	0.82*
Asked Consent to Search Property	0.07	0.66*	0.16*	0.45*	0.74*
Curbside Detention	1.05*	1.44*	1.05*	1.28*	0.53*
Discovery Rate	-0.52	1.22	-2.99*	-4.18*	2.09
Field Sobriety Test	0.54*	-0.42	3.75*	0.65*	-0.15
Firearm Point	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.20*	0.01
Handcuffed	1.30*	3.40*	2.62*	1.97*	2.61*
Psychiatric Hold	0.15	0.45*	-0.12*	0.08	0.15
Removed from Vehicle by Order	0.30*	-1.97*	1.45*	0.77*	-0.69*
Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact	-0.01	-0.39*	-0.05	0.06	-0.13*
Searched Person	0.84*	-0.24	2.49*	1.53*	1.10*
Searched Property	0.34*	0.06	0.47*	0.53*	1.14*

Note. Negative scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at lower rates that perceived fluent individuals; positive scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at higher rates that perceived fluent individuals.

In 2025, the greatest statistically significant differences between perceived language fluency in rates for actions taken or other stop outcomes were for those perceived as Asian and Hispanic/Latine(x). Officers reported discovering evidence/contraband in searches of individuals perceived as Asian with limited English fluency (27.03% of searches involving individuals perceived as Asian with limited English fluency) at a rate 1.20 times greater than for those perceived as Asian and English fluent (22.58% of searches involving individuals perceived as Asian with limited English fluency). This represents a 4.45 percentage point difference between the two groups.

Officers reported conducting field sobriety tests at a rate 2.60 times greater in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and having limited English fluency (5.98% of stops) compared to those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (2.30% of stops). This represents a 3.68 percentage point difference between the two groups. The difference contrasts

⁷⁴ For tables X1 – X5, an asterisk represents statistical significance within a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Due to the large number of statistical tests in this analysis, the confidence intervals were made stricter using the Bonferroni correction method. More information on the methodology of this analysis can be found in Appendix XX.

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with the smaller effects of English fluency for other race/ethnicities that all have less than one percentage point differences (-0.42 – 0.60) for the same action.

Officers handcuffed individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) with limited/no English fluency (12.49% of stops) at a rate 1.27 times greater than for those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and English fluent (9.84% of stops). This represents a 2.65 percentage point difference between the two groups. While this difference was the greatest between the two groups for those perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x), all other race/ethnicities had statistically significant effects of limited English fluency when being handcuffed by an officer (0.52 – 1.54).

These differences were noticeable in comparison to many of the other rates in which there was no noticeable difference by English fluency level, such as officers pointing their firearm in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) (a 0.04 percentage point difference, Black (a 0.05 percentage point difference), or White (a 0.05 percentage point difference). Across all statistically significant results, those perceived as Asian and Middle Eastern/South Asian had no actions or stop outcomes where the English fluent group had higher rates than the limited/non-English fluent group, while those perceived as Black, Hispanic/Latine(x), and White had a mix of higher and lower rates between the two groups.

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Table X4. Percentage point difference in rates of outcomes between perceived limited English fluency and perceived English fluency across all race/ethnicities for 2025 RIPA data.⁷⁵

Actions Taken/ Stop Outcomes	Asian	Black	Hispanic/ Latine(x)	Middle Eastern/ South Asian	White
Asked Consent to Search Person	0.26*	0.17	0.36*	0.24*	0.37*
Asked Consent to Search Property	0.28*	0.24	0.34*	0.18	0.49*
Curbside Detention	1.03*	0.34	1.16*	0.69*	-0.81*
Discovery Rate	4.45*	-0.03	-2.04*	-2.13	0.95
Field Sobriety Test	0.27*	-0.42	3.68*	0.60*	-0.18
Firearm Point	0.43*	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.05
Handcuffed	1.19*	1.54*	2.65*	1.29*	0.52*
Psychiatric Hold	0.21*	0.26	-0.15*	0.04	0.00
Removed from Vehicle by Order	0.35*	-2.11*	1.32*	0.49*	-0.70*
Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact	-0.01	-0.28*	0.00	0.03	-0.07*
Searched Person	1.08*	-0.56	2.55*	0.79*	-0.25
Searched Property	0.80*	-1.25*	0.70*	0.26	0.08

Note. Negative scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at lower rates that perceived fluent individuals; positive scores indicate perceived non-fluent English language speaking individuals experienced actions at higher rates that perceived fluent individuals.

Notable Trends Across Years from 2022-2025

While each year contains interesting findings, there were two results that were prevalent across most or all years that are important to note. First, certain actions consistently presented as having statistically significant differences for each race, and in each year. Second, certain perceived races/ethnicities had more statistically significant differences across actions/outcomes in each year compared to other races/ethnicities.

Officers consistently reported higher rates of handcuffing individuals they perceived as having limited/no English fluency. In each year from 2022 to 2025, and for each race/ethnicity reported, individuals perceived as having limited English fluency had higher rates of handcuffing compared to individuals perceived as being fluent in English. In every year, for each race, those differences are statistically significant. Two more actions had statistically significant differences between perceived English fluency level in each year for almost every perceived race/ethnicity

⁷⁵ For tables X1 – X5, an asterisk represents statistical significance within a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Due to the large number of statistical tests in this analysis, the confidence intervals were made stricter using the Bonferroni correction method. More information on the methodology of this analysis can be found in Appendix XX.

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reported: curbside detention and removal from vehicle by order. With a few exceptions, individuals of each race/ethnicity perceived as having limited/no English fluency had higher rates of curbside detention and being removed from vehicle by order in every year, and those differences were statistically significant. This highlights that certain actions may be impacted by language fluency, in a way others are not, or are used disproportionately in stops of individuals with limited English fluency for some reason.

English fluency influenced stops more significantly for Hispanic/Latine(x) and Middle Eastern/South Asian individuals. Across all years and all actions/stop outcomes, individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) and individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian had the highest number of actions/outcomes with statistically significant differences based on perceived English fluency level. Specifically, out of the 12 actions and outcomes presented in each table, individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) had nine or 10 actions/outcome with statistically significant differences based on perceived English fluency level in every year. Similarly, individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian had eight or more actions with statistically significant differences until 2025, where the number of stop actions/outcomes with statistically significant differences decreased to six. This highlights certain perceived races/ethnicities where the influence of perceived English fluency level may make a larger impact on their experiences with California law enforcement.

Comparison between 2022 and 2025 RIPA Data

The final aspect of the Board analysis examined whether the interaction between perceived language fluency and race/ethnicity changed in a statistically significant way over time by directly comparing the difference in rates for those perceived as non-English fluent and English fluent in 2022 and 2025, as they are the earliest and latest years of all agencies reporting respectively. This sort of comparison allows us to examine whether the effect of perceived English fluency has become stronger or weaker for each action/outcome between 2022 to 2025.


Many of the results show only minor differences for the interaction between language and race/ethnicity changing between years. The two greatest statistically significant differences were for those perceived as Asian and those perceived as Black, both with higher rates for perceived limited English fluency than for perceived English fluency in 2022 compared to 2025. These two actions are presented in Figure X1 below. For Asian individuals, the difference in discovery rates was 5.46 percentage points and for those perceived as Black, the difference in rates for handcuffing was 5.76 percentage points (see Figure X1 for a visualization of these changes between years for these two actions). The effect of perceived language fluency for individuals who were perceived as Asian for discovery rates and individuals perceived as Black for handcuffing was smaller in 2025 compared to 2022. As seen in Figure X1, the decrease in the effect of perceived language fluency was seen in all race/ethnicity groups for handcuffing except for Hispanic/Latine(x).

These differences were noticeable in comparison to many of the other rates in which there was no noticeable difference by English fluency level and year, such as removal from vehicle by physical contact in stops of individuals perceived as Asian (a 0.04 percentage point difference), Hispanic/Latine(x) (a 0.17 percentage point difference), or Middle Eastern/South Asian (a 0.02 percentage point difference). These results show that the effect, or lack thereof, of English fluency has remained consistent from 2022 to 2025.

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Figure X1. Difference rates for discovery rates (right) and handcuffing rates (left) in 2022 and 2025 alongside change in difference rates between 2025 and 2022.



Note. A red plus sign on the black bars in Figures X1 indicates a statistically significant difference between the two years of data.

Conclusion

The findings show that officers report taking certain actions and stop results at significantly different rates depending on the perceived English fluency of the individual stopped. Moreover, these differences are more pronounced for some racial/ethnic identities, particularly perceived Asian and Hispanic/Latine(x) individuals, who had the most actions and stop outcomes with statistically significant differences across the years. These differences also are relatively consistent over time, depending on the action/outcome and racial/ethnic group. Most of the actions/outcomes examined here had minor differences between 2025 and 2022, except handcuffing of individuals perceived as Black and discovery rates of individuals perceived as Asian. Examining the interaction between race and English fluency is important in the context of racial profiling, where combinations of perceived identity characteristics can have compounding effects—in this case, certain racial and/or ethnic groups are experiencing higher rates of adverse stop actions when officers perceive them to have limited English fluency more so than others.

V. TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FUTURE

In this section, the Board explores three technologies that may impact the future of racial and identity group profiling and disparities: Automated license plate reader systems, technology-assisted police body-worn camera footage review, and RIPA stop data analytics tools. As in its 2026 Annual Report, the Board addresses automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems in this year's report as an area requiring further consideration and assessment from the standpoint of

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racial and identity group profiling and disparities. The Board also assesses the emerging practice of using technology to review and analyze police body-worn camera footage, and how such review and analysis can inform efforts to reduce racial and identity group profiling and disparities. Finally, the Board looks at how California LEAs can use RIPA stop data analytics tools in the future to better equip themselves to act against racial and identity group profiling and disparities. It should be noted that, in discussing certain vendor products that are available to LEAs in this section, the Board is not endorsing any particular product(s) and is relying on publicly available information.

A. Automated License Plate Reader Technology

Automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems use cameras and computer software to scan the license plates of automobiles captured by their cameras, logging and storing information about the vehicle, such as the time and date and vehicle coordinates, and pictures.⁷⁶ In 2020, a survey and report issued by the California State Auditor found that the majority of California LEAs collected and used images captured by ALPR cameras.⁷⁷

The Board has recognized that ALPR systems “can be deployed to target communities of color and other marginalized populations,” and that there is evidence that ALPR cameras, and the queries that have been run against ALPR system databases, can contribute to racial profiling.⁷⁸ The Board has also recognized that concerns have arisen that ALPR systems might be misused by federal or out-of-state LEAs for immigration purposes, with the result that “the patterns of racial and other kinds of bias that are often present in local police encounters could bleed into patterns of federal immigration enforcement.”⁷⁹ In its 2026 Annual Report, the Board further recognized that ALPR systems do, or can, deliver public safety benefits and that some proponents of such technologies promote them as tools that may actually help reduce racial and identity profiling and disparities.⁸⁰ This section reviews ALPR systems’ expanding capabilities and applications, and continues the discussion from last year’s report.

1. Expanding Capabilities and Uses

ALPR systems are powerful surveillance and investigatory tools that are increasingly used to do much more than just read license plate numbers and check them against “hot lists” of stolen

⁷⁶ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) p. 119

<<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026]; U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025)

<<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026]; Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (2024) pp. 1-2 <<https://tinyurl.com/5279paxc>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁷⁷ Howle, *Automated License Plate Readers to Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects Report Number: 2019-118*, California State Auditor (Feb. 2020) <<https://information.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf>> [as of XX]; see Johnson, *California Kills Bill Regulating Flock Cameras Even as Public Outrage Grows* (Sep. 3, 2026) CalMatters <<https://tinyurl.com/4ffn7sj>> [as of xx, 2026] (reporting bill author’s estimate that more than 230 California LEAs currently use ALPRs).

⁷⁸ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) p. 120 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁷⁹ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 122-123 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁸⁰ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 116-117 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

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vehicles or other vehicles believed to be associated with certain criminal activity.⁸¹ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security notes that:

ALPR software ranges in complexity from simple smartphone apps that read plates and compare them against user-generated hot lists to sophisticated systems that use machine learning and artificial intelligence to conduct complex analysis. The most sophisticated software can process images, read the plate number, determine the make, model, color and year of a vehicle, compare plates against local and national hot lists, make predictions on probable routes of travel, send localized alerts to law enforcement units in the area, automatically generate vehicle activity reports, and analyze system results to improve future system accuracy.⁸²

The technology behind ALPR systems is becoming increasingly sophisticated. ALPR cameras can take pictures of individuals in vehicles⁸³ and are now being installed in law enforcement drones.⁸⁴ ALPR systems are also becoming capable of searching for “free-form information” in the photographs they take — “as an example, a ‘red truck with black toolbox mounted on the

⁸¹ See, e.g., Ludwig, *SCOTUS Ruling Could Be Bad News for Flock — But Won’t Stop Mass Surveillance* (Jul. 10, 2026) Truthout <<https://tinyurl.com/5bj5nh9v>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that one company’s cameras can create “heat maps” capable of tracking individuals); Stanley, *New Report Highlights How CBP and Border Patrol are Becoming a Repressive Internal Intelligence Agency* (Nov. 24, 2025) ACLU <<https://tinyurl.com/yc3s7hmk>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing the U.S. Custom and Border Patrol’s use of ALPR surveillance system to identify purportedly suspicious movement patterns); Grogan, *From Patrol Cars to Poles: How Automated License Plate Readers Became a Crime-Fighting Star* (Oct. 15, 2025) Police Chief <<https://tinyurl.com/yc7hbc69>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing expanding ALPR uses and capabilities and interconnections between ALPR systems and other technologies).

⁸² U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Nat. Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 6 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Bowman, *AI in Policing: Automatic License Plate Readers* (June 17, 2026) Center for Democracy & Technology <<https://tinyurl.com/ycx59a4z>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting on ALPRs’ increasing use of AI and offering of predictive analytics); U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Nat. Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026] (“ALPR systems now can read much more than license plates. ALPR software can detect dents on cars, search for specific bumper stickers, process specialty tags, and recognize rideshare logos”); U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Nat. Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 7 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing some systems’ capability to use AI to analyze photos and compare them to images in databases); U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Nat. Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 7 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026] (explaining that some systems can identify direction of travel and, where there are no egress routes without passing a camera, calculate the amount of time a vehicle remains within a defined area); Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (2024) p. 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/5279paxc>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Initially, ALPRs were thought of as a tool to help combat automobile theft, but their use has expanded. Agencies use ALPRs for a variety of purposes, including gathering intelligence and evidence, helping identify or apprehend potential suspects in a range of criminal investigations, locating missing or kidnapped individuals, and facilitating crime scene analysis”).

⁸³ Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (2024) p. 5 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026]; Cong. Research Service, *Exposed Data Highlights Law Enforcement Use of Selected Technologies* (2019) p. 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/2e59595y>> [as of XX, 2026]; Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Automated License Plate Readers* (Oct. 1, 2023) <<https://tinyurl.com/374zja9m>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁸⁴ Myle, *Meet Flock’s Alpha Drone – It Reads License Plates from 2,000 Feet* (Ju. 23, 2026) Gadget Review <<https://tinyurl.com/2eyj7tae>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lipton, *That Drone in the Sky Could Be Tracking Your Car* (Sept. 22, 2025) Electronic Frontier Foundation <<https://tinyurl.com/mr276vyc>> [as of XX, 2026].

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bed’ or a ‘blue, 4-door hatchback with yellow smiley face bumper sticker.’”⁸⁵ The systems are increasingly used as “a critical component in predictive policing,”⁸⁶ which includes the use of technologies to direct law enforcement to areas that have already been receiving a disproportionate share of policing, leading to a prediction of more crime in those areas, an increase in the intensity of policing in such areas, and the possibility of more racial profiling and disparities.⁸⁷ However, ALPR systems are subject to only limited state regulation.⁸⁸

2. ALPR Systems and Racial and Identity Profiling and Disparities

In its 2026 Annual Report, as noted above, the Board expressed concern that law enforcement ALPR systems could be deployed to target racial and other identity groups or exacerbate the effects of policing being disproportionately focused on certain communities, and that ALPR databases could be queried in racially biased ways.⁸⁹

Since that report was published, reported concerns about ALPR systems have focused on the types and degree of surveillance they enable, misuse of ALPR data, and access to ALPR data for immigration enforcement purposes,⁹⁰ and concerns about disproportionate racial impacts continue to be reported.⁹¹

3. California ALPR Data and Racial Profiling Connection to Immigration Enforcement

In its 2026 Annual Report, the Board expressed concern that ALPR data might be shared for immigration enforcement purposes.⁹² Public reporting has continued to draw attention to the matter of ALPR data being accessed for immigration enforcement purposes.⁹³

⁸⁵ U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 9 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁸⁶ U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers: Market Survey Report* (June 2025) p. 16 <<https://tinyurl.com/4c57a7a8>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Grogan, *From Patrol Cars to Poles: How Automated License Plate Readers Became a Crime-Fighting Star* (Oct. 15, 2025) Police Chief <<https://tinyurl.com/yc7hbc69>> [as of XX, 2026]; Kristin Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (2024) p. 2 <<https://tinyurl.com/5279paxc>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Police can also analyze stored LPR data to help identify patterns of suspicious or criminal activity”) (citing International Association of Chiefs of Police report).

⁸⁷ See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 119, 124 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁸⁸ Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

⁸⁹ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 120-122 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Vigdor, *Flock Cameras are Dividing U.S. Cities. Here’s What to Know About Them*, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2026); Wardwell, *Liberal Towns Backtrack on License Plate Trackers Amid Concerns About Privacy — and Trump* (Dec. 1, 2025) Politico <<https://tinyurl.com/mum4m43u>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹¹ Rivera, *Dozens Rally at Pasadena City Hall to Demand Removal of Flock Cameras* (Aug. 20, 2026) Pasadena Now <<https://tinyurl.com/2ada7f4u>> [as of XX, 2026]; Coleman, *Residents Raise Privacy, Equity Concerns Over Police Use of Flock Cameras* (Mar. 20, 2026) Pasadena Now <<https://tinyurl.com/4236ca2u>> [as of XX, 2026]; Cox, *Hampton Roads Flock Cameras Surveil Black Communities More Intensely Than White Ones* (Jan. 21, 2026) VPM News <<https://tinyurl.com/yc3zrv4m>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹² Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 122-123 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹³ See, e.g., Johnson, *California Kills Bill Regulating Flock Cameras Even as Public Outrage Grows* (Sep. 3, 2026) CalMatters <<https://tinyurl.com/4ffn7sju>> [as of xx, 2026]; Vigdor, *Flock Cameras are Dividing U.S. Cities. Here’s*

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California law addresses some of the concerns about misuse of data associated with ALPR systems by establishing requirements for ALPR systems, “including requiring detailed usage and privacy policies that describe the system’s purpose, who may use it, how the agency will share data, how the agency will protect and monitor the system, and how long the agency will keep the data.”⁹⁴ Specifically, California law prohibits any public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information “except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law.”⁹⁵ Importantly, the definition of public agency is limited to state or local agencies, including LEAs, and does not include out-of-state or federal agencies.⁹⁶ California “does not permit California LEAs to share ALPR information with private entities or out-of-state or federal agencies, including out-of-state and federal LEAs.”⁹⁷

Where authorities have access to information from ALPR systems for immigration enforcement, such as information about where a person travels, they can use that data to build profiles like the ones at issue in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, discussed above, which may include a person’s apparent race and/or their presence at particular types of locations. Such profiles can then be used to identify individuals to be stopped and questioned about their citizenship and immigration status.⁹⁸ California agencies’ ALPR data might also be used to help locate individuals who

What to Know About Them, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2026); Myers, *Chico PD Granted ICE, Border Patrol, Access to its ALPR Data* (Jul. 25, 2026) ChicoSol <https://tinyurl.com/34js69tk> [as of XX, 2026]; Van Neely & Fahmy, *Feds ‘Improperly’ Accessed S.F. License-Plate Surveillance Data, Audit Finds* (Jun. 17, 2026) Mission Local <<https://tinyurl.com/z2eahms4>> [as of XX, 2026]; Koebler, 404 Media, *Florida’s Wildlife Cops are Searching Thousands of Flock Records for ICE* (Apr. 2, 2026) (“The practice highlights how ICE, which does not have a contract with Flock, continues to get access to Flock’s AI-powered license plate scanning cameras through local and state police, and often in ways that are unusual, unexpected, and difficult for the public to track or hold the agency accountable for”); Hartnett, *The Nationwide Revolt Against Flock Safety Cameras* (Feb. 27, 2026) The New Republic <<https://tinyurl.com/ubpwmptd>> [as of XX, 2026]; Pinsof, *San Jose Can Protect Immigrants by Ending Flock Surveillance System* (Feb. 12, 2026) Electronic Frontier Foundation <<https://tinyurl.com/nsfmnr3>> [as of XX, 2026]; Margaretten & Morgan, *Amid Immigration Crackdown, Mountain View Discovers Unauthorized Access to License Plate Data* (Jan. 30, 2026) Palo Alto Online <<https://tinyurl.com/2j6mutah>> [as of XX, 2026]; Hofer, Blog, *Why Are The Alameda County Sheriff And SFPD Sharing So Much Data With 287(g) Agencies?* <<https://tinyurl.com/56awfeza>> (Dec. 7, 2025) Secure Justice [as of XX, 2026]; see also Wardwell, *Liberal Towns Backtrack on License Plate Trackers Amid Concerns About Privacy — and Trump* (Dec. 1, 2025) Politico <<https://tinyurl.com/mum4m43u>> [as of XX, 2026].

⁹⁴ Howle, *Automated License Plate Readers to Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects Report Number: 2019-118*, California State Auditor (Feb. 2020) <<https://information.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf>> [as of XX].

⁹⁵ Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (b). Data hosting or towing services are not considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information.

⁹⁶ See Cal. Dept. of Justice, Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2023-DLE-06, *California Automated License Plate Reader Data Guidance* (Oct. 27, 2023) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2023-dle-06.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026]. Code, §1798.90.5, subd. (f).

⁹⁷ Cal. Dept. of Justice, Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2023-DLE-06, *California Automated License Plate Reader Data Guidance* (Oct. 27, 2023) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2023-dle-06.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026]. California LEAs must understand and fulfill their obligations under this law and are encouraged to review Information Bulletin 2023-DLE-06 issued by the Office of the Attorney General providing guidance on the storage, collection, sharing, and use of ALPR data.

⁹⁸ See *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (S. Ct. No. 25A) Application to Stay the Order Issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California and Request for an Immediate Administrative Stay (Jul. 11, 2025) 2025 WL 2323447 (U.S. government brief to U.S. Supreme Court defending immigration authorities’ consideration of a person’s apparent race, and whether the person speaks Spanish, as factors in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop people in the Central District of California to investigate their immigration status, including in

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immigration authorities have targeted for immigration enforcement activity based on their race. In other words, the Board is concerned that if accessible for immigration enforcement purposes, information from California ALPR systems could contribute to the practice of racial profiling (and unlawful detentions) in California by immigration authorities.⁹⁹ The Board does not have specific evidence that the use of information from California ALPR systems to facilitate racial profiling in immigration enforcement has been happening to date, but it is an area of legitimate concern because there are reported instances where ALPR data has been accessed for immigration enforcement purposes,¹⁰⁰ reported instances where ALPR data has been used to identify locations where individuals travel for immigration enforcement purposes,¹⁰¹ and evidence indicating that a person's race, including in combination with a person's presence at particular types of locations, has been treated as a factor in determining who to stop for immigration enforcement investigations in parts of California.¹⁰²

In view of the foregoing — and because California law prohibits the sharing of ALPR data with non-California entities¹⁰³ and restricts immigration enforcement assistance¹⁰⁴ — California jurisdictions that use ALPR systems should take all reasonable measures to ensure their ALPR data is not being made accessible to authorities engaged in immigration enforcement who may

combination with a person's presence at particular types of locations (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.), or the type of work a person does).

⁹⁹ Cf. Gov. Code, § 7284.2, subd. (e) (finding and declaring that state and local participation in federal immigration enforcement programs raises constitutional concerns that California residents could be detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and targeted on the basis of race or ethnicity in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Sharing of California agencies' ALPR data for immigration enforcement purposes is problematic (and unlawful) for other reasons too. Under California law, including the California Values Act, California law enforcement officers are generally restricted from assisting in immigration enforcement, subject to exceptions, including for individuals convicted of certain serious or violent crimes. (See Gov. Code, §§ 7282.5, 7284.6.) And California law restricts California LEAs from sharing their ALPR data with federal agencies for immigration enforcement purposes. (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5, subd. (f), 1798.90.55, subd. (b); California Dept. of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2023-DLE-06, *California Automated License Plate Reader Data Guidance* (Oct. 27, 2023).) In light of its mandate to work for the elimination of racial and identity profiling, however, the Board is focused on the nexus between access to information from California agencies' ALPR systems, rather than enforcement of the Values Act or the ALPR data-sharing law as such.

¹⁰⁰ See *supra*, footnote XX—The referenced footnote is the one supporting the text that reporting has continued to draw attention to ALPR data being accessed for immigration enforcement purposes, and starts with a cite to the Johnson CalMatters article.

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., Tau and Burke, *Border Patrol is Monitoring US Drivers and Detaining Those With 'Suspicious' Travel Patterns* (Nov. 20, 2025) AP < <https://tinyurl.com/3h2zz4dd> > [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has been using ALPR data from various jurisdictions to identify and detain people whose travel patterns it deems suspicious); Koebler and Cox, *ICE Taps Into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows* (May 27, 2025) 404 Media < <https://tinyurl.com/msjhxmys> > [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that ICE was getting "side door" access to other jurisdictions' ALPR data by having local and state police perform searches in their ALPR databases or even nationwide ALPR databases).

¹⁰² See, e.g., *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (S. Ct. No. 25A) Application to Stay the Order Issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California and Request for an Immediate Administrative Stay (Jul. 11, 2025) 2025 WL 2323447 (U.S. government brief to U.S. Supreme Court defending immigration authorities' consideration of a person's apparent race, and whether the person speaks Spanish, as factors in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop people in the Central District of California to investigate their immigration status, including in combination with a person's presence at particular types of locations (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc., or the type of work a person does)).

¹⁰³ Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5, subd. (f), 1798.90.55, subd. (b).

¹⁰⁴ Gov. Code, § 7282.5.

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also be engaging in racial profiling. Under the law, ALPR operators and end-users must “[m]aintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”¹⁰⁵ ALPR operators and end-users must implement a usage and privacy policy meeting specified minimum requirements to ensure the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information “is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.”¹⁰⁶ If they access or provide access to ALPR information, ALPR operators are also required to maintain records pertaining to accessing or providing access to ALPR information, as specified in the law.¹⁰⁷ In general, the actions that ALPR operators and end-users are legally required to take to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure are set forth in the California Civil Code.¹⁰⁸

Agencies can also help protect their data by becoming as knowledgeable as possible about who is able to access their data, directly or indirectly. Agencies should recognize that even where federal authorities are not themselves able to run a search on a California agency’s data, they might be able to have another entity that has been able to gain such access run the search for them.¹⁰⁹ Another measure that can be taken is to conduct regular audits to identify and log instances in which it appears that searches may have been run on the agency’s data for immigration enforcement purposes.¹¹⁰ Agencies can inform and remind their employees about the law against California agencies sharing ALPR data with non-California entities. Employees can be trained, for example, that they are not to run searches on their agency’s ALPR data for anyone other than another California public agency, and agencies can also choose to place more

¹⁰⁵ Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.51, subd. (a) (operators), 1798.90.53, subd. (a) (end-users). An “ALPR operator” is “a person that operates an ALPR system,” and, in general, an “ALPR end user is a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system.” *Id.*, § 1798.90.5, subds. (a), (c).

¹⁰⁶ Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.51, subd. (b) (operators), 1798.90.53, subd. (a) (end-users).

¹⁰⁷ Civ. Code, § 1798.90.52.

¹⁰⁸ Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.51, 1798.90.52, 1798.90.53.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Center for Human Rights, University of Washington, *Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement* (Oct. 21, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/mr2xf33n>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Press Release, Oxnard Police Dept., *Oxnard Police Department Suspends Use of Flock Safety Automated License Plate Readers* (Feb. 27, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/yzjaw849>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that audits revealed that federal LEAs had been able to run searches in city’s ALPR data); City of Mountainview, Council Report, *Automated License Plate Reader Contract* (Feb. 24, 2026) p. 14 <<https://tinyurl.com/4fm2v932>> [as of XX, 2026] (same); Univ. of Wash. Center for Human Rights, *Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement* (Oct. 21, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/mr2xf33n>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing the types of audits that can be run in one leading ALPR provider’s product); see generally California Attorney General, *Promoting Safe and Secure Government Access for All: Guidance and Model Policies to Assist State and Local Agencies in Responding to Immigration Issues Pursuant to Senate Bill 580 (2025)* (Jul. 2026) pp. 36-37 <<https://oag.ca.gov/publications#immigration>> [as of XX, 2026] (recommendations regarding database audit criteria to ensure that databases and information-sharing practices or systems are governed in a manner that limits the availability of information for immigration enforcement purposes).

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restrictions than they currently have — on who within the agency is able to access the agency’s ALPR data.¹¹¹ on the length of time it retains ALPR data.¹¹²

Public visibility is also important. Existing California law requires a public agency that operates or intends to operate an ALPR system to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.¹¹³ Because ALPR technology and data can be used to target certain racial or identity groups for surveillance or profiling, the Board encourages increased openness and disclosures by agencies in regard to how they are using their ALPR systems and data. It is also critical that jurisdictions provide ongoing opportunities for the public to comment on the use of ALPR systems or ALPR data, particularly those jurisdictions that are considering expanding the purposes for which they are using ALPR systems or data, or beginning to use new or additional ALPR system functionalities.

B. Technology-Assisted Body Worn Camera Footage Review

This section looks at the potential for using technology assisted police body-worn camera (BWC) footage to help reduce racially biased policing.

1. Background

Police BWCs record officers’ interactions with the public.¹¹⁴ Recorded footage is typically stored on secure servers or cloud-based platforms.¹¹⁵ LEA usage of body worn cameras is widespread and expected to increase.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ California Attorney General, *Promoting Safe and Secure Government Access for All: Guidance and Model Policies to Assist State and Local Agencies in Responding to Immigration Issues Pursuant to Senate Bill 580* (2025) (Jul. 2026) California Attorney General, p. 33 <<https://oag.ca.gov/publications#immigration>> [as of XX, 2026] (advising agencies to implement database access controls in order to limit the availability of information for immigration enforcement purposes).

¹¹² Civ. Code, § 1798.90.51, subd. (b)(2)(G) (giving ALPR operator discretion how long to retain ALPR information); Civ. Code, § 1798.90.51, subd. (b)(2)(G) (giving ALPR end-user discretion how long to retain ALPR information); California Attorney General, *Promoting Safe and Secure Government Access for All: Guidance and Model Policies to Assist State and Local Agencies in Responding to Immigration Issues Pursuant to Senate Bill 580* (2025) (Jul. 2026) California Attorney General, pp. 36-37 <<https://oag.ca.gov/publications#immigration>> [as of XX, 2026] (advising agencies to limit retention periods for information databases in order to reduce exposure to information being available for immigration enforcement purposes purposes).

¹¹³ Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., Strom, *Research on the Impact of Technology on Policing Strategy in the 21st Century: Final Report* (May 2016) RTI International Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 3-4, <<https://tinyurl.com/y8mnwnaz>> [as of XX, 2026]; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Body-Worn Camera Frequently Asked Questions* (2015) p. 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/3njbsayz>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹¹⁵ Morris, *What is a Body Worn Camera?* (Nov. 25, 2025) AEANET.org <<https://tinyurl.com/mrvrtyvk>> [as of XX, 2026]; Note, *Body-Worn Camera Footage Retention and Release: Developing an Intermediate Framework for Public Access in a New Affirmative Disclosure-Driven Transparency Movement* (Oct. 2022) 122 Colum. L.Rev. 1729, 1735 <<https://tinyurl.com/y7c37ewf>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹¹⁶ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2250 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that as of 2020, 79% of all local police officers worked in departments that used BWCs and that use is accelerating among sheriffs and federal LEAs) [Throughout: Should we be giving a a url cite for this law review article?]; Lyons, *California Highway Patrol Lags Local Police, Other States in Officer Body Cams* (Mar. 3, 2022) CalMatters <<https://tinyurl.com/y3u8xzvp>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that CalMatters had queried more than a

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Potential benefits of BWCs include improved public perception of law enforcement legitimacy, improved transparency and accountability, the creation of training opportunities, and the ability to monitor the success of policing strategies.¹¹⁷ BWC use could potentially also help reduce racially biased policing, including both intentional disparate treatment and disparate treatment caused by implicit bias.¹¹⁸ For example, in its 2025 Report, the RIPA Board recommended requiring that BWC footage be used in POST RIPA-related training.¹¹⁹

2. Emergence of Technology-Assisted BWC Review

The vast amount of BWC footage that exists offers a trove of information that could be used to learn about and improve policing through review and analysis.¹²⁰ But in general, the large

dozen of California's largest police and sheriff's departments and found that nearly all had at least some body cameras); Byrhonda Lyons, *California Highway Patrol Fell Behind Other Agencies on Body Cams. Now it's Trying to Fix That* (Jul. 10, 2025) CalMatters <<https://tinyurl.com/5a8wps45>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that 7,600 California Highway Patrol officers were expected to receive BWCs by March 2026). For additional background on police use of BWCs, see, e.g., Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025), 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA* (2018) 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141 <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026]; Strom, *Research on the Impact of Technology on Policing Strategy in the 21st Century: Final Report* (May 2016) RTI International Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 3-4, 4-13 <<https://tinyurl.com/y8mnwnaz>> [as of XX, 2026]. I haven't been able to find a url for this one that isn't just a pdf link, and I could also use a second pair of eyes on the cite form.

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, pp. 3-4 <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/policing/paac107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026]; Chapman, *Body-Worn Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us* (Jan. 2019), National Institute of Justice, pp. 1-2 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/body-worn-cameras-what-evidence-tells-us>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Stoughton, *Police Body-Worn Cameras*, 96 N. Car. L.Rev. 1363, 1378-1399 (2018) <<https://tinyurl.com/ja29sej4>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing potential symbolic, behavioral, and informational benefits from having police use BWCs); Miller et al., *Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned* (2014) Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 5-9.

¹¹⁸ [Footnote numbering needs to be fixed; currently jumping from 122 to 124] See, e.g., Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA* (2018) 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, 171-173 <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026]; Stoughton, *Police Body-Worn Cameras* (2018) 96 N. Car. L.Rev. 1363, 1370, 1375 <<https://tinyurl.com/ja29sej4>> [as of XX, 2026]; Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA* (2018) 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, 144-145, 147-158, 170, 171-172 <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Southerland, *The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Justice System* (2021) 80 Md. L.Rev. 487, 548 <<https://tinyurl.com/2p9udusz>> [as of XX, 2026] ("Body-worn cameras were widely adopted to curtail police violence against communities of color").

¹¹⁹ Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) p. 13 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 12, 128, 131 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting researchers' recommendation that BWC footage be used to train officers and examine their behavior in the field as part of efforts to address implicit bias and reduce disparities).

¹²⁰ [Footnote numbering needs to be fixed; currently jumping from 125 to 128] See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) p. 7

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volume of BWC footage makes manual review of more than a small fraction of existing footage infeasible.¹²¹ Manual review also lacks the ability to detect certain language and behavioral patterns that occur across encounters between police and civilians.¹²² Without the capacity to review and analyze footage on a large scale and in depth, the ability to realize BWCs' vast potential has been significantly limited, including with regard to using BWCs to address racially biased policing.¹²³

However, speech recognition technology and continuing advances in artificial-intelligence (AI)-driven analytics have made it possible to automate and expand the review and analysis of large volumes of police BWC footage.¹²⁴ Automatic speech recognition tools convert BWC audio into

<<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2255, 2259, 2284-2285 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform* (Oct. 23, 2024) Stanford Report <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (undated) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; Fan, *Body Cameras, Big Data, and Police Accountability* (2018) 43 Law & Social Inquiry 1236 <<https://tinyurl.com/mucx4anv>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²¹ See, e.g., Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2253, 2257-2259 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform* (Oct. 23, 2024) Stanford Report <<https://tinyurl.com/r899ymne>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/policing/paae107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?* (Apr. 16, 2024) MIT Technology Review <<https://tinyurl.com/mpz8n6jy>> [as of XX, 2026]; Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage* (Feb. 2, 2024) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/98uc99yp>> [as of XX, 2026]; Jany, *AI Could Become Answer to Studying Bodycam Footage*, Los Angeles Times (Nov. 19, 2023); Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer* (Mar. 31, 2023) CNA <<https://tinyurl.com/rccxccc4t>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²² See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) p. 8 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²³ See, e.g., Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2253, 2255 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform* (Oct. 23, 2024) Stanford Report <<https://tinyurl.com/yc6psufk>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?* (Apr. 16, 2024) MIT Technology Review <<https://tinyurl.com/mpz8n6jy>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) 114 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 6521, 6521 <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026] ("Left unexamined are the common, everyday interactions between the police and the communities they serve.").

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) p. 8 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2253-2254 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform* (Oct. 23, 2024)

Stanford Report <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx

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text transcripts, and then language processing and machine learning models examine the transcripts to identify patterns in language and run analyses.¹²⁵ Technologies can also be applied to review and analyze BWC audio and video, rather than just text.¹²⁶ Computer science methods for analyzing language are applied as part of some analyses.¹²⁷ To date, there have been several different types and applications of technology-assisted BWC footage review. Again, it should be noted that the Board is not endorsing any particular product(s) and is relying on publicly available information.

Some companies market products to LEAs for reviewing their BWC footage.¹²⁸ For example, one product has generated labels that single out positive and negative performances by police

<<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026]; Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer* (Mar. 31, 2023) CNA, pp. 2-3, 5, 7 <<https://tinyurl.com/rccxcc4t>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (undated) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²⁵ See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), pp. 1-2 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2161-2162 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?* (Apr. 16, 2024)

MIT Technology Review <<https://tinyurl.com/mpz8n6jy>> [as of XX, 2026]; Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer* (Mar. 31, 2023) CNA <<https://tinyurl.com/rccxcc4t>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²⁶ Srbínovska et al., *Towards AI-Driven Policing: Interdisciplinary Knowledge Discovery from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Jun. 19, 2025) <<https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20007>> [as of XX, 2026] (introducing a framework demonstrating the potential of combining AI-driven audio, text, and image processing with advanced AI techniques for knowledge discovery from BWC footage); Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer* (Mar. 31, 2023) CNA <<https://tinyurl.com/rccxcc4t>> [as of XX, 2026]; Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police* (2021) 121 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol.: Attitudes and Soc. Cognition 1157; Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) 114 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 6521, 6525 <<https://tinyurl.com/2s39wfwz>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting some vendors' claims to products that analyze both video and audio).

¹²⁷ See, e.g., Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform* (Oct. 23, 2024) Stanford Report <<https://tinyurl.com/r899ymne>> [as of XX, 2026]; Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops* (2018) 6 Transactions Assn. Computational Linguistics 467, 478 <<https://tinyurl.com/erszxhrr>> [as of XX, 2026]; Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) 114 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 6521 <<https://tinyurl.com/2s39wfwz>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²⁸ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2253-2254 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026];

Peterson, Blog, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*

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officers, which are flagged for supervisor review.¹²⁹ Preliminary evaluation and case studies of agencies using the product have shown an increase in product-measured “high professionalism,” a reduction in unprofessional behavior, and a suggestion that “the technology is associated with reductions in the use of force, civilian non-compliance, and increases in officer explanation.”¹³⁰ The product has been used by LEAs in California.¹³¹

In addition, LEAs have partnered with outside researchers to have their BWC footage reviewed and analyzed, often for the purpose of identifying correlations between factors present during stops and stop outcomes.¹³² For example, a research team began a three-year study in 2023 to review BWC footage from roughly 1,000 Los Angeles Police Department traffic stops to develop measurements of interactions between officers and the public, with such measurements to be used to analyze thousands of additional videos, and factors including stop location and driver’s race to be part of the analysis.¹³³

Researchers using technology-assisted BWC review have found police officers demonstrating lower levels of respect, warmth, and ease to Black community members,¹³⁴ and using different

Answer (Mar. 31, 2023) CNA <<https://tinyurl.com/rccxc4t>> [as of XX, 2026]; Alcorn, *Police Body Cam Maker Unveils New Features it Hopes Will Curb Officer Misconduct* (Oct. 28, 2020) CNN Business <<https://tinyurl.com/4htvstrz>> [as of XX, 2026]; *Priority Ranked Video Audit Settings in Axon Performance* (Jul. 21, 2026) Axon <<https://tinyurl.com/3pcx5xfp>> [as of XX, 2026]; *TrustStat: The World’s First Multimodal AI System for the Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Video* (undated) Polis <<https://tinyurl.com/y7nwh42d>> [as of XX, 2026]; *Virtual Chief of Staff* (undated) Truleo <<https://truleo.co/virtual-fto>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹²⁹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2264 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹³⁰ Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/policing/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of Apache Junction, AZ, and Casa Grande, AZ police departments); Univ. of S.C., Dept. of Criminology and Crim. Just., *Truleo Evaluation Experiment: Executive Summary* (Aug. 28, 2024) <<https://tinyurl.com/3sbsmube>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of Aurora, CO, police department and Richland County, SC, sheriff’s department).

¹³¹ Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage* (Feb. 2, 2024) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/98uc99yp>> [as of XX, 2026]; *Anaheim Police to Deploy Body Camera Analytics* (Apr. 19, 2023) PR Newswire <<https://tinyurl.com/2da2zhkm>> [as of XX, 2026]; *Torrance Police Department Signs on to Receive Software for BWC Review* (Mar. 2, 2023) Police 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/3p69x352>> [as of XX, 2026]; *California Police Departments Aim to Improve Policing with Body Camera Analytics* (Jan. 24, 2022) PR Newswire <<https://tinyurl.com/4ea3424x>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹³² Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (undated) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; CSI Lab, Washington State University, *Improving Support and Safety Through Partnership and Innovation* – the italicized text is the header above the discussion on the website (undated) <<https://labs.wsu.edu/csi/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage* (Feb. 2, 2024) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/98uc99yp>> [as of XX, 2026]; Jany, *LAPD Would Delete Nearly 12 Million Body Camera Videos Under Proposed Policy Change*, Los Angeles Times (Jan. 29, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/53wjxm3d>> [as of XX, 2026]; Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) p. 6 <<https://tinyurl.com/vxysywuc>> [as of XX, 2026] – this is a report that was filed in a lawsuit – should it be cited as such? I.e., cite to the case and the docket number etc.?

¹³³ USC Dornsife News Staff, *AI Meets Policing: USC Leads LAPD Body Cam Study* (Sep. 1, 2023) <<https://tinyurl.com/yct2pnpt>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹³⁴ Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police* (2021) 121 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol.: Attitudes and Soc. Cognition 1157, 1161 <<https://tinyurl.com/mr24sm62>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of stops over the course of a month in an unidentified,

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language when seeking consent to search based on the race of the person stopped.¹³⁵ In addition, researchers have found racial disparities in unreported encounters that potentially should have been reported as detentive stops based on the language used,¹³⁶ and racial disparities in unreported stops that show signs of being unconstitutional based on the language used.¹³⁷ Studies also show that technology-assisted review can be used to assess the effectiveness of measures that might be adopted for the purpose of curtailing racially biased policing.¹³⁸

3. For The (Potential) Future: Using Technology-Assisted BWC Footage Analysis in the Effort to Reduce Racial Bias in Policing

The discussion above shows that technology-assisted BWC review can be used to help detect and measure potential bias in policing (including racial profiling as defined by RIPA), develop certain types of interventions to help curtail bias in policing, and measure the implementation and effectiveness of such interventions.^{139 140} Thus, technology-assisted BWC review should be

medium-sized U.S. city); Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) (2017) 114 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 6521 <<<https://tinyurl.com/2s39wfwz>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of Oakland Police Department).

¹³⁵ Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) pp. 5, 64, 67, 73 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of New York Police Department).

¹³⁶ Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) pp. 2-4, 41, 65, 66, 67, 73 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of New York Police Department).

¹³⁷ Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) pp. 37, 42-43 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of New York Police Department).

¹³⁸ Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) p. 68 <<https://tinyurl.com/v33cu597>> [as of XX, 2026] (asserting that the study researchers' models can help measure whether interventions actually change officer behavior); Camp et al., *Leveraging Body-Worn Camera Footage to Assess the Effects of Training on Officer Communication During Traffic Stops* (Sept. 2024) 3 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. Nexus 359 <<https://tinyurl.com/uzdphe8w>> [as of XX, 2026] (finding that Oakland Police Department training had resulted in officers employing more of the officer-communicated-respect techniques recommended for improving police-community interactions); Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops* (2018) 6 Transactions Assn. Computational Linguistics 467, 478 <<https://aclanthology.org/Q18-1033/>> [as of XX, 2026] (concluding that study of 2017 Oakland Police Department stops demonstrated that dialog structures produced by researchers' automated tagger could reveal whether officers follow law enforcement norms like introducing themselves, explaining the reason for the stop, and asking permission for searches and that the researchers' model can be used to study whether police training has an effect on the kinds of conversations that police officers have with the community).

¹³⁹ This Report neither endorses nor disapproves law enforcement use of BWCs but rather takes their use by many California LEAs as a given for present purposes.

¹⁴⁰ See also Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police* (2021) 121 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol.: Attitudes and Soc. Cognition 1157, 1168 <<https://tinyurl.com/2s39wfwz>> [as of XX, 2026] (concluding that BWC footage can be used to analyze events that disproportionally impact communities of color, such as escalation, including use of force); cf. Rho et al., *Escalated Police Stops of Black Men are Linguistically and Psychologically Distinct in Their Earliest Moments* (May 30, 2023) 120 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. No. 23, p. 5 <<https://tinyurl.com/mpj6fje5>> [as of XX, 2026] (study of stops in

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a part of future efforts to reduce racially biased policing. Subsections (a)-(f) are based on the idea that technology-assisted BWC review should be part of future efforts to reduce profiling and bias in policing and discuss some of the issues and concerns that should be addressed in order to make it possible to move thoughtfully, carefully, and productively into that future.

a. Access to BWC Footage and Police Review Platforms

Commentators have noted that the practice of transcribing and annotating recorded police encounters “can help begin to unlock perhaps the greatest untapped reservoir of data about policing,” and that review of such data has the potential to provide insight that could benefit both the police agencies and the communities they serve.¹⁴¹ However, they caution that when communities pay for BWCs and then “ignore the insights these data might offer,” that potential is wasted.¹⁴² Instead, agencies “must rethink traditional notions of who owns BWC footage” and should treat the footage as “‘civic data,’ owned by the public, not by the police,” and footage “should be made far more widely available for research and training purposes.”¹⁴³

Observers have likewise asserted that it is not enough to harness the potential in this area that LEAs have access to BWC footage and technological tools to review it.¹⁴⁴ Broader access to footage and review platforms is required. For example, policymakers could require, “at the time of purchase, that BWC analytics platforms adopted by police also be made available to prosecutors, public defense offices, and oversight entities in the jurisdiction.”¹⁴⁵ Access to footage might not be made equal — the authors referenced above suggest that footage might be made available with court authorization or by legislation — but such entities would “not be at a

medium-sized, racially diverse U.S. city finding that in stops resulting in escalation, officers are more likely to issue commands as their opening words to the driver and less likely to tell drivers the reason why they are being stopped).

¹⁴¹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284-2285 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁴² Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284-2285 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁴³ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284-2285 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] LEAs; see]; see Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2286-2288 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing the status quo under which LEAs act as BWC footage owners and controllers); Southerland, *The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Justice System* (2021) 80 Md. L.Rev. 487, 548 <<https://tinyurl.com/2p9udusz>> [as of XX, 2026] (“the institutional actors holding the tools of accountability have not changed, which means the tools have not been able to meet their potential”).

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?* (Apr. 16, 2024) MIT Technology Review <<https://tinyurl.com/mpz8n6jy>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that outsiders do not know what terms police are searching for, reporting one researcher’s comments that “[p]olice departments have little incentive to ask pointed questions about racial bias,” and stating that, “[t]he promise of these bodycam-to-text programs won’t be fully met if key terms, phrases, and interactions aren’t commonly tagged and analyzed”); see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2282 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2270-2271 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing how one leading platform’s product and messaging has changed over time in response to push back from line officers and law enforcement labor organizations).

¹⁴⁵ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2282 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] LEAs].

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technological disadvantage when it comes to review BWC footage.”¹⁴⁶ Further, the discussion above shows the value of making BWC footage available to researchers.

One set of commentators has discussed what an expanded-access regime might look like, including a “data trust” model, under which controls are set on who has access to footage and the nature of different users’ access.¹⁴⁷ Any access regime would need to protect privacy rights and interests.¹⁴⁸ Companies offering analytics platforms should be required to enter into agreements about permissible and impermissible data uses.¹⁴⁹ Researcher access should be provided in ways to keep officer and civilian identities confidential.¹⁵⁰ Subsets of footage collections could be put in more controlled environments for individuals working to develop working on new review and analytics technologies.¹⁵¹ Police background checks might be required for individuals accessing collections who might have access to personally identifiable information.¹⁵² Given the high privacy interest stakes, the need for strong privacy protections to facilitate any type of BWC footage access regime is critical and legislation would be required to ensure the need is properly met.¹⁵³

The extent to which the public might currently be able to access California police BWC footage under the State’s public records law is beyond the scope of this Report. However, under current California law, LEAs or entities establishing policies and procedures for the implementation and operation of a body-worn camera system are required to consider various “best practices regarding the downloading and storage of body-worn camera data,”¹⁵⁴ including that such data be considered the property of the law enforcement agency, and “shall not be accessed or released for any unauthorized purpose.”¹⁵⁵ This statute does not limit the public’s right to access recorded data under the California Public Records Act.¹⁵⁶ Generally, the California Public Records Act does not require the disclosure of law enforcement investigation

¹⁴⁶ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2286-2288 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁴⁷ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2288-2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; see generally Friedman, *Policing Agency Data Trusts* (2026) 120 N.W. U. L.Rev. 817 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5yexmch>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁴⁸ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2290-2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (emphasizing the importance of protecting officer and civilian privacy rights when making BWC footage available).

¹⁴⁹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁵⁰ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁵¹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁵² Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6521, 6525 <<https://tinyurl.com/7b3ujmcp>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁵³ Privacy protections are discussed further in section XX below in the context of how vendor analytics platforms and research applications can take measures to reduce privacy invasion risks.

¹⁵⁴ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b).

¹⁵⁵ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(8).

¹⁵⁶ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (d).

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records.¹⁵⁷ That Act has a specific provision regulating when BWC footage related to a “critical incident,” as defined in the Act, may be withheld.¹⁵⁸

In sum, to better realize the potential for using technology-assisted BWC footage review to help address racial and identity profiling, BWC footage must be made more accessible beyond LEAs. At the same time, the need to protect privacy is also very important.

b. Retaining BWC Footage for Study

In general, having a large volume of police BWC footage to review — including a collection that covers enough time to encompass potentially relevant changes in law, policies, practices, and training — will increase the potential learning opportunities such footage may offer where technology is being leveraged to perform the review and analysis.¹⁵⁹ At the same time, storage costs are obviously a consideration.

Under California law, agencies establishing policies and procedures for BWC systems must consider the following “best practices.”¹⁶⁰ First, the following footage should be retained for at least two years: (1) footage of incidents involving the use of force or an officer-involved shooting; (2) footage of an incident that leads to an individual’s detention or arrest; and, (3) footage relevant to a formal or informal complaint against a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement agency.¹⁶¹ Second, footage that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution should be retained for the same time that other evidence that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution must be retained.¹⁶² Third, in general, all other footage should be retained for at least 60 days.¹⁶³

c. Surveillance, Criminal Investigation, and Disparate Policing

The 2026 RIPA Report discussed the need to consider how technologies used by law enforcement may be concentrated on certain racial groups and the harm that can follow.¹⁶⁴ Technology-assisted BWC footage review warrants the same circumspection. In particular, the use of technology-assisted BWC footage review by police poses risks to civilian privacy — heightened by the potential integration of other surveillance technology tools — and raises the possibility that the technology will be used as a law enforcement surveillance and investigation tool, despite BWCs’ original purposes being to improve police training, accountability, and transparency.¹⁶⁵ This risk will be greater for communities that are already disproportionately

¹⁵⁷ Gov. Code, § 7923.600, subd. (a).

¹⁵⁸ Gov. Code, § 7923.625. Footage relates to a “critical incident” if it depicts an incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer or an incident in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person resulted in death or in great bodily injury. Gov. Code, § 7923.625, subd. (e).

¹⁵⁹ See Fan, *Body Camera, Big Data, and Police Accountability* (2018) 43 Law & Social Inquiry 1236 <<https://tinyurl.com/mucx4any>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁶⁰ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b).

¹⁶¹ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(B).

¹⁶² Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(C).

¹⁶³ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(A).

¹⁶⁴ Racial and Identity Profiling Board, Annual Report (2026), pp. 114-124 <<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁶⁵ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2252-2253, 2255, 2267-2268 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx <<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/policing/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?* (Apr. 16, 2024) MIT Technology Review

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policed.¹⁶⁶ And it is reasonable to expect that such communities will be disproportionately impacted by law enforcement actions and privacy incursions that follow from using technology-assisted BWC footage review as a surveillance and investigatory tool directed at civilians. Regulators may find the risks presented by some BWC analytics platforms are too great to permit their use by LEAs.¹⁶⁷ Vendor analytics platforms can be designed to limit the risk that they will be used by law enforcement for surveillance or investigative purposes — e.g., by focusing on audio rather than video, redacting personally identifiable information (PII) from transcripts, and controlling whether and how transcripts are searched.¹⁶⁸

d. Privacy Issues

(1) Vendor analytics platforms

Because technology-assisted BWC footage review increases the amount of footage reviewed by humans, law enforcement officer privacy protections “are a relevant consideration.”¹⁶⁹ It has been suggested that LEAs “should be transparent when using BWC analytics, making clear to officers the purpose of the tool, the information it will analyze, and the sorts of judgments it (with supervisor review) will make.”¹⁷⁰ Vendor analytics products can be designed to protect the privacy of the officer and the individual stopped, such as by not identifying or authenticating individuals based on their voice, storing officers’ personally identifiable information separately from audio analysis, and not analyzing videos marked as confidential within the agency’s evidence management system.¹⁷¹ In addition, vendor analytics products can and should provide officer and citizen privacy protections as appropriate to the context — e.g., not revealing personally identifiable information where it is not needed.¹⁷² Additional privacy protections for

<<https://tinyurl.com/mpz8n6jy>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (undated) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2283 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (considering the possibility of prohibiting police BWC analytics as presenting an outsized risk to “equity”).

¹⁶⁷ See Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2283 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting the possibility of prohibiting BWC analytics that pose outsized risks to privacy, equity, and other values, “such as BWCs with real-time facial recognition capabilities”).

¹⁶⁸ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2268-2269 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁶⁹ *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (2024) 18 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice xx, xx

<<https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paee107/7828028>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that police have raised officer privacy concerns).

¹⁷⁰ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁷¹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁷² See Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2284 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (undated) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Data privacy is another critical concern. BWC footage often contains sensitive personal information—for example, an individual’s address or phone number. To protect individual privacy, and because such information is not needed for BWC footage to serve accountability or research

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citizens are discussed in the section above relating to the interests in vendor BWC analytics products not being used for surveillance or investigation purposes.

(2) Researchers

Privacy interests are also implicated when researchers have access to BWC video collections to conduct studies using technological tools, which studies may sometimes involve human reviewers as well. Researchers report being able to use techniques to protect officer and community member privacy.¹⁷³ In one study, researchers reported that, to protect privacy, they and their transcribers underwent police background checks, data was maintained on a central server, and speech unnecessary to the study was removed from the transcripts.¹⁷⁴ Researchers can redact personally identifiable information in transcripts,¹⁷⁵ remove identifying information from audio recordings,¹⁷⁶ and blur faces and remove private or sensitive information,¹⁷⁷.

e. Democratic Authorization

Commentators have advocated for LEAs to employ the concept of “democratic authorization,” or an analysis of the impact to the rights and public safety of individuals, to determine whether to implement technologies, including products that permit LEAs to review and analyze BWC footage.¹⁷⁸ The democratic authorization process, including providing an opportunity for public

ends, any system or program that analyzes BWC footage should ensure personally identifiable information is redacted before it reaches human reviewers.”).

¹⁷³ USC Dornsife News Staff, *AI Meets Policing: USC Leads LAPD Body Cam Study* (Sep. 1, 2023) <<https://tinyurl.com/yct2pnpt>> [as of XX, 2026] (“All data regarding individuals featured in the videos will be anonymized in the final report.”); Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) 114 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6521, 6525 <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026]; Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police* (2021) 121 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol.: Attitudes and Soc. Cognition 1157, 1159-1160 <<https://tinyurl.com/2s39wfwz>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2291 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that in a “data trust” model for sharing BWC footage, “[r]esearchers might get access only to audio transcript, keeping officer and public identities confidential”).

¹⁷⁴ Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect* (2017) 114 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6521, 6525 <<https://tinyurl.com/7b3ujmcp>> [as of XX, 2026] (transcribers and researchers underwent police background checks).

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops* (2018) 6 Transactions Assn. Computational Linguistics 467, 469 <<https://tinyurl.com/3kp83pm8>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., Rho et al., *Escalated Police Stops of Black Men are Linguistically and Psychologically Distinct in Their Earliest Moments* (2023) 120 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. No. 23, p. 4 <<https://tinyurl.com/mpj6fje5>> [as of XX 2026].

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., Sribinowska et al., *Towards AI-Driven Policing: Interdisciplinary Knowledge Discovery from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/3sv77ccr>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁷⁸ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2279 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2279 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026] (“when police obtain and use technology without permission or transparency, there can be backlash. This undermines public trust and sometimes ends up depriving police of a tool that might have furthered community safety.”); cf. Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten*

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input and debate, ensures transparency and strengthens public trust in law enforcement's use of these technologies; absent such a process, LEAs run the risk of undermining public trust and could face backlash.¹⁷⁹

As noted above, with regard to automated license plate reader systems, California law requires a public agency that operates or intends to operate an ALPR system to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.¹⁸⁰ The California Legislature could enact similar legislation related to the purchase and use of technology-assisted BWC footage review tools. Regarding expanded access to BWC footage for study and analysis using technology-assisted BWC footage review, if this matter is to be left to local jurisdictions to decide, the Legislature could again impose a public notice and comment opportunity requirement.

f. Transparency

Transparency for communities and policymakers can be facilitated by vendors of technology-assisted BWC review disclosing how their products work, including how the vendor developed its artificial intelligence models and how it validated its outputs.¹⁸¹ LEAs can “develop, implement, and make public a use policy that explains how officers and supervisors are to use the platform,” and “make public at least aggregate data gleaned from their use of the platform.”¹⁸² Legislative bodies can require such disclosures and policies, which can also respond to privacy concerns and other civil liberties issues.¹⁸³

California law currently requires LEAs to consider certain “best practices” in establishing policies and procedures for their BWC systems that may be relevant to transparency issues arising from using technology-assisted footage review (including by third-party researchers), including, but not limited to: (1) that records or logs of footage access should be retained permanently;¹⁸⁴ (2) that where an agency uses a third-party vendor to manage storage, the agency should consider whether the vendor is using a system that has a built-in audit trail to prevent data tampering and unauthorized access;¹⁸⁵ and, (3) that footage “shall not be accessed or released for any unauthorized purpose.”¹⁸⁶

Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA (2018) 9 Colum. J. Race & L. 141, 180

<<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026] (proposing model policy for police BWC activation and asserting that, “[a]ny efforts to adopt this model ought to be preceded by meaningful community consultation, especially with regard to the countervailing privacy interests”).

¹⁷⁹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2279 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]

¹⁸⁰ Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

¹⁸¹ Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2281 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁸² Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2281 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁸³ See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5-1798.90-55 (statutes regulating use of ALPR systems); Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b) (statute requiring consideration of best practices relating to downloading and storage of police BWC footage).

¹⁸⁴ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(E).

¹⁸⁵ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(7)(C).

¹⁸⁶ Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(8).

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C. Stop Data Analytics Tools for LEAs

The RIPA Board seeks a future in which agencies are better able to make use of their RIPA stop data to improve outcomes, with the ultimate objective being to eliminate racial and identity profiling. Stop data analytics tools that are available to agencies — whether offered by third-party vendors, developed by agencies themselves, or provided by researchers or consultants — would likely be a part of this future.

Having RIPA data analytics tools puts agencies in a better position to identify racial disparities that may be indicative of racial profiling and to assess what might be causing observed disparities and how they might be addressed. Data analytics tools might also help to identify subsets of stops that warrant deeper study through the types of technology-assisted BWC footage review discussed above, either by focusing third-party vendor review tools on those stops, or by having interested researchers perform such work. Agencies equipped with analytics tools may similarly be in a better position to assess what they are doing that might be reducing racial and identity profiling or disparities. If nothing else, for any given agency, data analytics tools can be used to enhance public reporting of an agency's RIPA stop data.

1. Stop Data Analytics Tools

Some California LEAs use products offered by third-party vendors for their officers to record their RIPA stop data. Such vendors may offer associated product features that enable agencies to gather (and report) analytics on their RIPA data on a continuous basis.¹⁸⁷ While the RIPA Board does not recommend any particular product or tool, one product offering publicly advertises that such tools may be used to show stop data by year, month, race, use of force, and other data elements, to provide detailed demographic breakdowns by race or other identity groups, and to show data regarding reasons for stops, stop results, and search data.¹⁸⁸ Marketing materials suggests the software can be configured to run customized RIPA data analytics for an agency based on its interest areas.¹⁸⁹ Agencies that find a need for third-party products should undertake research of available offerings to fit their needs.

Some agencies use their own technology or forms for their officers to record their RIPA stop data. Depending on its resources, such an agency may be able to run its own RIPA stop data analytics. Indeed, in general, any agency, *provided it has the resources*, is capable of analyzing its RIPA stop data, whether the agency uses its own tools to record stop data or a third-party vendor's tools.

In addition to what agencies may do on their own, each year's RIPA Report includes disaggregated statistical data for each reporting law enforcement agency reported by the DOJ.¹⁹⁰ This data is only reported on an annual basis, however, and does not include any time series data or longitudinal analyses. The types of RIPA stop data analytics tools under discussion here may be more robust in these regards.

¹⁸⁷ Press Release, Veritone, *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/4jkj5ktm>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁸⁸ Press Release, Veritone, *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/4jkj5ktm>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁸⁹ Press Release, Veritone, *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/4jkj5ktm>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁹⁰ Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (j)(3)(E).

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2. Agency Disclosures Reflecting the Use of Stop Data Analytics Tools

Some California LEAs publish their reported RIPA stop statistics.¹⁹¹ For example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has an online RIPA data information data dashboard/interactive database that gives nearly up-to-date numbers and statistics and includes a filtering function to view data disaggregated by calls for service versus deputy-initiated calls, bicycle stops, vehicle stops, pedestrian stops, station name, and city/area.¹⁹² The data can also be viewed for viewer-selected date ranges.¹⁹³ This dashboard/interactive database is reflective of the types of data (and filtered data) that can be generated with the types of stop data analytics tools under discussion here.

One private website reflects the use of data analytics tools to show agency-level RIPA stop data for a large collection of California agencies, including some statistical disparities measures, including data filtered by year, which facilitates year-over-year comparisons.¹⁹⁴

3. Using Analytics Tools to Improve Outcomes

Provided they have the resources, agencies can acquire or develop stop data analytics tools to apply to the raw RIPA stop data they are collecting for RIPA reporting requirements to go beyond merely generating numbers and statistics that are not contextualized.¹⁹⁵ Tools that enable agencies to generate and publish statistics related to particular areas, organizational units, officers, types of stops, time periods, or other stop data elements, alone or in combination, can be used to provide agencies, policymakers, civilian oversight entities, community members, and researchers with potentially valuable insights.¹⁹⁶ Analytics tools that facilitate analyses by time periods in particular are useful insofar as they make it possible to compare data (e.g., racial and identity group statistical disparities) from before the date that a relevant reform or other event was implemented or occurred with data from after that date.¹⁹⁷ Trends may be more readily

¹⁹¹ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., *AB-953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard* <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026]; San Francisco Police Dept., *Police Department Stop Data* <https://data.sfgov.org/Public-Safety/Police-Department-Stop-Data/ubqf-aqzw/about_data> [as of XX, 2026] (data reportedly updated quarterly); see also Los Angeles Police Dept., *LAPD Community RIPA Dashboard* <<https://www.lapdonline.org/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026] (online "RIPA dashboard" but reporting pages blocked without a valid account sign-in as of XX, 2026). The City of Oakland Police Department publishes annual stop data statistics reports on its website. City of Oakland, *Data from Police Officer Visits and Stops* <<https://tinyurl.com/3y83kpzr>> [as of XX, 2026]. The Board has not verified the accuracy of the data in these sources.

¹⁹² Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., *AB-953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard* <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁹³ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., *AB-953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard* <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁹⁴ RIPA Explorer, *Agency Explorer* <<https://ripastops.org/>> [as of XX, 2026]. The Board has not determined whether all RIPA-reporting agencies are included in this interactive database tool. The Board has not verified the data on this site.

¹⁹⁵ Press Release, Veritone, *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/mrx3x36u>> [as of XX, 2026] (vendor product marketing this functionality); Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., *AB-953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard* <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026] (data dashboard indicating the department has acquired or developed such analytics).

¹⁹⁶ See generally Pryor et al., *Collecting, Analyzing, and Responding to Stop Data: A Guidebook for LEAs, Government, and Communities* (2020) <<https://www.policingproject.org/stopdata>> [as of XX, 2026].

¹⁹⁷ See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2026) pp. 125-151 (comparing stop data and statistics before and after policy reforms).

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identified when agencies have the ability to see their stop data in real time or to run comparisons across time periods. It is not possible to design and implement interventions in response to trends if the trends are not observed.

4. Other Considerations

Similar to the case of technologies for reviewing police BWC footage, discussed above, a process of democratic authorization, including community review and input, may be appropriate before a law enforcement agency makes any significant expenditure to acquire (or develop) stop data analytics tools.¹⁹⁸ Decisionmakers can also consider hearing from various stakeholders about the types of stop data analyses the agency should be running and the format and functionalities desired of data dashboards or other reporting systems to be provided by the agency.

There are also transparency considerations.¹⁹⁹ The values of trust and accountability can be served when agencies (and third-party vendors, as applicable) are transparent about the data they are using, how any non-obvious aspects of their analytics tools operate, how they are resolving any significant data issues, how various terms used in their reporting are defined, and what the various data fields they show are capturing.²⁰⁰ Agencies using stop data analytics tools can also be transparent about how they are using the tools and the data they generate to try to reduce racial and identify profiling and disparities. Agencies can also help justify their investments in stop data analytics tools by disclosing the analyses they are generating and by making the tools available to non-agency actors, as through interactive online dashboards and databases.

D. Conclusion

The Board encourages LEAs to consider the potential benefits and concerns discussed above when deciding whether to implement, or implementing, any of the above technologies.

VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

[Area for Board discussion. Below are potential policy recommendations based on the research and data discussed above, for the Board's consideration and input.]

Potential recommendations related to *Kavanaugh* stops

1. *To ensure clarity and consistency and compliance with RIPA, all LEAs that have policies related to racial or identity profiling should ensure that their policy's definition of prohibited "racial or identity profiling" is the same as the definition codified at Penal Code section 13519.4, subdivision (e), which is "the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or*

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a) (requiring an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting before implementing an automated license plate reader program; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2279-2280 <<https://tinyurl.com/pxm89jw9>> [as of XX, 2026]; see generally Barry Friedman, *Democratic Policing* (2015) 90 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1827, 1832-1835.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2281-2282 <<https://tinyurl.com/pxm89jw9>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing transparency issues related to use of technology-assisted police body-worn camera review).

²⁰⁰ Cf. Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform* (2025) 46 Cardozo L.Rev. 2247, 2281-2282 <<https://tinyurl.com/pxm89jw9>> [as of XX, 2026].

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physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop, except that an officer may consider or rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description. The activities include, but are not limited to, traffic or pedestrian stops, or actions during a stop, such as asking questions, frisks, consensual and nonconsensual searches of a person or any property, seizing any property, removing vehicle occupants during a traffic stop, issuing a citation, and making an arrest.”

Potential recommendations related to perceived English fluency

2. *LEAs should consider creating standardized language-need protocols for officers to use as a structured tool to identify language needs, rather than making on-the-spot judgments, to reduce the risk that race/ethnicity shapes assumptions about who need language support.*
3. *LEAs should acquire and use real-time translation technology, if non-English fluency is having a disproportionate impact on a particular racial or ethnic group.*

Potential recommendations related to ALPR systems

4. *The Legislature should amend Civil Code section 1798.90.55, subdivision (a), to provide: (1) that a public agency that operates an automated license plate reader system and that intends to expand the functionalities or uses of the system or the information it collects beyond what was disclosed in a prior noticed meeting of the agency’s governing body shall provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the expansion; and, (2) a public agency that operates an automated license plate reader system and did not provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the system (or before expanding the functionalities or uses of the system or the information it collects) shall, within 90 days, provide an opportunity for public comment regarding the agency’s use of the system at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency.*

Potential recommendations related to BWC footage review

5. *LEAs should audit BWC footage specifically for language-related interactions to detect patterns and identify potential areas for improvement.*
6. *The Legislature and local legislative bodies should enact legislation: (a) requiring police body-worn camera footage to be retained for at least [x years], and allocating funds to pay for such retention on a showing of need; and, (c) providing for public and researcher access to body-worn camera footage collections for review and study, subject to provisions designed to protect active, ongoing investigations, protect individually identifiable personal information, protect privacy rights and interests (including legitimate privacy rights and interests of all individuals involved or identified in recorded incidents), protect data security, and prevent misuse, and allocating funds to support the provision of such access.*
7. *The Legislature should enact legislation similar to Civil Code section 1798.90.55, subdivision (a), requiring a public agency that operates or intends to operate a technology-assisted body-worn camera footage review platform to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.*

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8. *The Legislature should enact legislation requiring that agencies operating a technology-assisted body-worn camera footage review platform shall not use the platform as a tool for surveilling or investigating civilians.*

Potential recommendations related to stop data analytics tools

9. *The Legislature or local legislative bodies should enact legislation allocating funds to State and local LEAs to procure data analytics tools that generate statistical analyses of the agency's RIPA stop data—including racial and identity group disparities—as the data is collected electronically, on a real-time, continuous basis, and require agencies receiving such funds to provide such the agencies' RIPA stop, and the statistical analyses run on the data using the procured analytics tools, on their websites, and to provide the data in a manner that allows for interactive use, such as filtering by time periods, locations, other variables, and combinations of variables, to the greatest extent reasonably possible.*

VII. VISION FOR FUTURE REPORTS

[Area for Board discussion]

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